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After a campaign denigrating Muslims as “sick people,” blaming the 
children of Muslim Americans for terrorism, and promising to “shut 
down” Muslim immigration, and mere days after his inauguration, 
President Donald J. Trump banned the nationals of seven majority-
Muslim countries from entry into the United States. In the litigation that 
followed, one question persisted: how should courts analyze an 
exclusion order when the President invokes a national security 
justification, and there is also direct evidence of racial or religious 
animus? The United States Supreme Court reviews exclusion decisions 
deferentially for the existence of a “facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason,” under Kleindienst v. Mandel, but explicit animus raises a key 
question: what effect, if any, does explicit presidential animus have on 
this deferential standard of review?  
 
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s 
grant of a preliminary injunction against the third version of the travel 
ban. The majority deferred to the President’s national security 
justification, despite smoking gun evidence of anti-Muslim animus, 
because it determined that animus was not the “sole” motive for the 
travel ban. In dissent, Justice Sotomayor argued that a reasonable 
observer would conclude that the travel ban’s “primary purpose” was 
to express hostility toward Muslims, and deference was unwarranted. 
At the root of this debate is a disagreement about the proper analysis of 
mixed motives.  
 
Analyzing deference and analogous doctrines in other areas of law, this 
Article argues for a third way: that courts should use a mixed motives 
framework invalidating a contested law where the same law would not 
have been promulgated but for animus. Under this approach, plaintiffs 
must “plausibly” allege animus with “sufficient particularity.” Upon 
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the government must 
proffer some evidence of an independently sufficient justification, apart 
from animus, for the challenged policy. Ultimately, the plaintiffs must 
prove that animus was a necessary motive for the contested law. This 
framework invalidates laws lacking sufficient non-animus justification 
                                                                                                                     
 * Visiting Lecturer (to July 1, 2019) and Assistant Professor of Law (effective July 1, 
2019), Culverhouse School of Law at the University of Alabama. J.D., Harvard Law School; 
A.B., Stanford University. I am grateful to William Araiza, Alfred Brophy, Richard Delgado, 
Ronald Krotoszynski, Joseph Landau, Flavia Lima, Peter Margulies, Fatma Marouf, Hiroshi 
Motomura, Kenneth Rosen, and Jean Stefancic for helpful comments on earlier drafts. For 
enriching conversations about this project, I thank Dean Mark Brandon, Stephanie Bornstein, 
Charu Chandrasekhar, Maura Dundon, Martha Minow, Eloise Pasachoff, Ramya Ravindran, 
Sugata Ray, and Stacey Steinberg. Brenton Smith provided outstanding research assistance.  
14 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:1 
but permits laws for which animus is not a necessary motive. This 
Article seeks to offer a way for courts to capture better the benefits of 
immigration deference while minimizing the costs.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 27, 2017, Tareq and Ammar Aziz, brothers from Yemen, flew 
into Dulles International Airport outside Washington, D.C. to reunite with their 
father, Aquel, a U.S. citizen.1 After landing, however, officers told them their 
visas were “canceled” and sent them back on the first flight to Ethiopia, where 
Ethiopian officials confiscated their identification papers. President Donald J. 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Rachel Weiner & Paul Schemm, These Brothers Were Forced out by Trump’s 
Executive Order. On Monday, They Moved to the U.S., WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/these-brothers-were-forced-out-by-
trumps-executive-order-on-monday-they-moved-to-the-us/2017/02/06/0a150fec-e977-
11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html?utm_term=.446a349249a2 [https://perma.cc/BLP7-
ZW3G].  
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Trump’s first travel ban thwarted their reunion, “a year and a half in the 
making.”2 
Aquel Aziz first came to the United States as a student in 2001 and 
eventually became a permanent resident and then a citizen.3 He lived in Flint, 
Michigan. For years, Aquel sent money to help support his sons, who were 
living with their mother, Aquel’s ex-wife. The boys lived well, and then the civil 
war in Yemen started. Gunfire was commonplace, and then “Saudi-led airstrikes 
began,” and conditions worsened.4 The boys witnessed the victims of these 
attacks, dead or limbless, and knew they had to escape. With no U.S. embassy 
in Yemen, obtaining visas required them to travel some distance. They traveled 
by car and air to Djibouti—via Qatar—for interviews at the U.S. embassy there. 
On January 25, their applications for permanent residency, or “green cards,” 
were approved. On January 27, the brothers arrived at Dulles, leaving Yemen’s 
bloodshed behind them. However, reporters note that Customs and Border 
Patrol (CBP) officials stopped them, telling them, “Yemenis, this way.”5 CBP 
officials detained and handcuffed the brothers and then told them that their 
“visas were canceled.”6 The brothers asked if they could call their lawyer, but 
the officials said no, “[I]t’s a presidential order. You can’t do anything.”7 
Officials then instructed the brothers to sign the papers presented to them or be 
barred from entering the United States for five years.8 Not understanding what 
they were signing, the brothers signed away their right to permanent residence 
and were removed on the next flight to Ethiopia.9 Unfortunately, in Ethiopia, 
officials confiscated the brothers’ Yemeni passports, effectively erasing any 
path of exit, trapping them in a country where they had no status.10  
The Aziz brothers were just two of thousands of noncitizens whose life 
plans were upended by President Trump’s travel bans.11 These bans against 
foreign nationals, mostly from majority-Muslim countries,12 have revived 
                                                                                                                     
 2 Id.; see also Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) 
(describing “immediate and widespread” impact of the ban, including “that thousands of 
visas were immediately canceled, hundreds of travelers with such visas were prevented from 
boarding airplanes bound for the United States or denied entry on arrival, and some travelers 
were detained”). 
 3 Weiner & Schemm, supra note 1.  
 4 Id.  
 5 Id.  
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Weiner & Schemm, supra note 1.  
 10 Id. 
 11 See Amrit Cheng, The Muslim Ban: What Just Happened?, ACLU (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/muslim-ban-what-just-happened 
[https://perma.cc/CDW7-RGQY] (describing impact on families). 
 12 The last of the three travel bans barred nationals from Venezuela and North Korea as 
well. See Proclamation No. 9645, Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities 
and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other 
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dormant questions about whether courts must defer to the political branches 
under the “plenary power” doctrine13 even where the President demonstrates 
animus toward a racial or religious group.  
Although Congress, and not the President, possesses “plenary power” in 
immigration law,14 Congress has delegated exclusion power to the President 
through 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f),15 and courts have characterized other discretionary 
exclusions as “plenary.”16 Moreover, some scholars and judges contend even 
today that the President possesses “inherent” power to exclude noncitizens.17 
“Plenary” suggests “absolute” power, but most scholars and judges today regard 
such a notion as incompatible, or at least in serious tension, with a Constitution 
granting the federal government only limited powers.18 Most interpret “plenary 
power” to mean some form of nonjusticiability, and in immigration law 
                                                                                                                     
Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45166, at § 2(d), (f) (Sept. 24, 2017) (describing 
reasons for including North Korea and Venezuela). 
 13 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599–600 
(1889). Critics contend that “plenary power” lacks a textual basis in the Constitution, despite 
the attempt to ground it in the Naturalization Clause of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See Ilya 
Somin, The Constitutional Rights of Noncitizens, LEARN LIBERTY (Apr. 30, 2017), 
http://www.learnliberty.org/blog/t-he-constitutional-rights-of-noncitizens 
[https://perma.cc/UCV6-KDJE]. Courts have also described it as an “inherent power” of 
every sovereign. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) 
(describing the exclusion of noncitizens as “a fundamental act of sovereignty” and arguing 
that it stems not from a legislative delegation, but “is inherent in the executive power to 
control the foreign affairs of the nation”). Alternatively, Professor David A. Martin 
characterizes plenary power as a federalism doctrine, one ensuring the dominance of the 
federal government vis-à-vis the states in immigration law. See David A. Martin, Why 
Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 31 (2015).  
 14 I.N.S v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983) (describing Congress’s power over 
noncitizens as plenary) (emphasis added); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The 
President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 478 (2009).  
 15 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1995 § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018). 
 16 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972).  
 17 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
Knauff); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
318 (1936) (stating that the “powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the 
affirmative grants of the Constitution”); Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Knauff for the 
proposition that the President possesses the inherent power to exclude noncitizens); Martin, 
supra note 13, at 36 (“[A]sserting jurisdiction over a territory, which includes authority to 
choose which noncitizens to admit or exclude, is simply part of what it means to be a 
sovereign nation.”).  
 18 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 757–58 (1893) (Fields, J., 
dissenting) (dismissing notion of an “inherent” power to deport foreigners); GERALD L. 
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 120–21 (1996); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, 
Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 385 (2004) (“The notion that a federal 
power can derive from another source or be inherent in sovereignty is at odds with this 
tradition.”). 
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specifically, it amounts to deference.19 With respect to exclusion laws, courts 
will uphold a decision for any “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason, the 
standard first articulated in Kleindienst v. Mandel.20  
Defenders of plenary power deference argue that the doctrine preserves the 
President’s ability to act quickly and flexibly, enabling him to balance 
competing considerations without being second-guessed by courts in areas 
where the President often has superior expertise and responsibility.21 Critics 
contend, however, that judicial deference in this arena often leaves serious gaps 
in constitutional protection for noncitizens and essentially legitimates invidious 
discrimination.22 Expansive discretion may also lead to inefficiency, waste, and 
poor policy design because deference preserves a space for laws based on 
stereotypes, lax presumptions, and other poor reasoning.23  
Does this laxity between means and ends extend to the President’s motives? 
In the wake of President Trump’s travel bans, the question becomes: how should 
courts analyze constitutional challenges to an exclusion order where the 
President offers a national security rationale for the order, but plaintiffs also 
have direct evidence of the President’s racial or religious animus toward the 
                                                                                                                     
 19 See NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 134 (“The more enduring legacy of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case in constitutional doctrine is not the claim that constitutional limits on the 
immigration power do not exist, but . . . that courts should be wary of enforcing them.”), and 
138 (describing “the application of ‘political question’ reasoning—either as a denial of 
justiciability or as an extraordinarily deferential standard of review”); Cox, supra note 18, at 
382–83. 
 20 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. Although a point of debate, many judges applied Mandel 
to the travel bans. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017) (per 
curiam); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir. 2017), 
vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). The Supreme Court applied Mandel as well. 
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419–20. 
 21 See Martin, supra note 13, at 42; see also William D. Araiza, Deference to 
Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 884 n.20 (2013). See generally Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1079–90 (2008) (identifying legal and epistemic authority 
bases for deference). 
 22 See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1998) (arguing that plenary 
power doctrine was born in cases “authorizing racial discrimination—and sympathetic to 
that discrimination”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) (noting the association of inherent powers decisions with the rise 
in “nativist, nationalistic, and authoritarian impulses among the nation’s political elites that 
justified the subjugation of ‘inferior’ peoples”).  
 23 See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, 
in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 345 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (arguing 
that mandatory detention of noncitizens pending removal, purportedly justified by 
Congress’s plenary power, is wasteful and ineffective). 
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individuals the order targets?24 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), the President has the 
authority to exclude noncitizens whose entry he determines would be 
“detrimental” to U.S. interests.25 Courts have reviewed the scope of this 
authority under Mandel.26 As the lower courts adjudicated the multiple lawsuits, 
two competing interpretations of the Mandel standard emerged. The first, 
advanced by the government and accepted by a number of federal appellate 
judges, would shield the President’s exclusion directives from judicial scrutiny 
so long as he articulates one “facially legitimate” reason, no matter how 
insubstantial, even if he also expresses animus toward the excluded group.27 The 
second, articulated by the Fourth Circuit majority in Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, extends deference only to good faith deliberations.28 On this 
view, where plaintiffs “plausibly allege” bad faith, such as animus, with 
“sufficient particularity,” deference evaporates, and courts may apply strict 
scrutiny.29 In sum, the lower courts that analyzed the effect of the President’s 
anti-Muslim statements on the validity of his travel bans have taken one of two 
views: full, continued deference, provided the President supplies even one 
legitimate reason for the challenged policy30 or, alternatively, no deference at 
all.31  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii, reversing the Ninth 
Circuit’s affirmance of the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, 
mirrored this debate.32 The majority adopted the view that the government’s 
articulation of one legitimate reason, no matter how flimsy, could insulate the 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Other scholars have posed a version of this question. See Michael Kagan, Is the 
Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law? (The President Is Trying to Find Out), 1 NEV. L.J. 
F. 80, 81 (2017).  
 25 Immigration & Nationality Act of 1995 § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018). Under 
the tripartite framework articulated in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, also known as the Steel Seizure Case, the President’s power is 
at its “maximum” when “the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization 
by Congress.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952). 
 26 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591 (4th Cir.), vacated 
as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.); Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1179 (9th Cir. 
2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 27 See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1183 (arguing that a law excluding noncitizens 
should not be invalidated unless animus is the sole purpose of the law) (emphasis added). 
 28 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 592 (“And having concluded that the 
‘facially legitimate’ reason proffered by the government is not ‘bona fide,’ we no longer 
defer to that reason and instead may ‘look behind’ EO-2.”).  
 29 See id. at 593 (applying strict scrutiny to plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claims).  
 30 See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1183 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc).  
 31 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591.  
 32 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). As noted above, however, the 
Supreme Court assumed the “sole” motive standard applied but did not decide the question. 
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ban from further scrutiny under Mandel,33 while the dissenters found deference 
unwarranted because of the ban’s discriminatory “primary purpose.”34 
This Article, however, rejects both extremes—the former for confusing 
deference for abdication, and the second for requiring excessive precision by 
the political branches in a realm implicating foreign affairs.35 Drawing on Equal 
Protection, Establishment Clause, and Due Process jurisprudence, this Article 
argues that courts should use a mixed motives analysis to review an exclusion 
law where plaintiffs have direct evidence of animus. This framework requires 
the plaintiff to allege racial or religious animus with particularity and for the 
defendant to then come forward with evidence of a legitimate national security 
justification, with the plaintiff carrying the ultimate burden of proof that animus 
was a “but-for” motive behind the exclusion policy.36 This approach preserves 
substantial deference while holding accountable purveyors of animus and, thus, 
takes both deference and animus seriously. As explained below, the “but-for” 
mixed motives framework ultimately offers no defense from the implementation 
of animus-driven policy where the same policy would have been adopted 
regardless of animus, but this approach nonetheless has expressive value.37 It 
offers resort to legal process to advance the values of legitimacy and 
accountability while respecting the separation of powers.38  
Part II provides an overview of the travel ban litigation and illustrates the 
two views of plenary power deference that emerged in the litigation—absolute 
deference that tolerates any amount of animus and deference that evaporates 
upon a showing of any animus. Part III explains the concept of deference 
generally and the evolution of plenary power deference specifically. Part IV 
examines Equal Protection and Establishment Clause jurisprudence relevant to 
racial and religious discrimination and further examines in an analogous setting, 
that of vindictive prosecution, how courts analyze discretionary decisions where 
                                                                                                                     
 33 Id. at 2419–20. 
 34 Id. at 2445 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 35 For the argument that subjecting exclusion law to normal constitutional analysis 
“throw[s] . . . the baby [out] with the bathwater,” see Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and 
Sovereignty: Judicial Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1, 66 (2018).  
 36 For an explanation of the four principal motive standards in the law, see Andrew 
Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1159–60 (2018) 
(arguing that nearly all motive standards in the law reduce to just four: sole, but-for, primary, 
and any). Although Professor Verstein “avoids” using any causation language, it is useful in 
this Article’s analysis. Id. at 1124. 
 37 See Kagan, supra note 24, at 89 (suggesting that review of animus-driven exclusion 
policy might survive scrutiny if animus was not a “but for” cause of the challenged law); cf. 
Deborah A. Widiss, Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2083, 
2147 (2017) (arguing for laws protecting people against discrimination on the basis of 
marital status and sexual orientation, in part due to the “expressive value in laws proclaiming 
certain kinds of discrimination to be impermissible and unacceptable”). 
 38 But see Jacob T. Levy, The Limits of Legalism, NISKANEN CTR. (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-limits-of-legalism/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ8R-HQL3]  
(arguing that the only serious check on abuses of plenary power is politics). 
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the decisionmaker has exhibited animus. Drawing on insights from this 
jurisprudence, this Article proposes a mixed motives framework to analyze 
animus-based immigration law. Under this framework, plaintiffs must plead 
animus with sufficient particularity, and defendants must come forward with 
evidence showing that animus was not necessary to the challenged law.39 
Plaintiffs will not win merely upon a showing that animus “tainted” the 
exclusion law or that animus predominated over an independently sufficient 
legitimate justification. But the exclusion law also will not survive judicial 
scrutiny simply upon defendants’ showing that some other motive also played a 
role. Part V applies this framework to the Trump travel bans. Finally, it further 
considers the most likely objections to this approach. In so doing, this Article 
takes both deference and animus seriously and seeks to introduce nuance into a 
largely binary discussion of immigration deference.  
II. TRAVEL BAN LITIGATION OVERVIEW 
The travel ban litigation serves as a valuable setting for analyzing what 
effect animus should have on plenary power in immigration. Each of the three 
bans raised distinct legal issues, and the numerous lawsuits challenging the bans 
featured a variety of statutory and constitutional claims.40 Despite the array of 
claims, they all allude to a single question: whether, and under what 
circumstances, might direct evidence of animus undermine or even defeat the 
President’s broad authority in immigration. This Part describes the claimed 
statutory basis for the travel bans, the factual background providing direct 
evidence of animus, and the court decisions that grappled with whether to defer 
to the President under the circumstances, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  
Most scholars and jurists characterize the President’s authority in 
immigration law as delegated by Congress, but some continue to regard it as an 
inherent power of the Executive.41 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) states: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 39 See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1137–39 (describing the “But-For Motive standard”). 
 40 See Litigation Documents & Resources Related to Trump Executive Order on 
Immigration, LAWFARE, https://lawfareblog.com/litigation-documents-resources-related- 
trump-executive-order-immigration [https://perma.cc/59DC-WLGU] [hereinafter Litigation 
Documents]. 
 41 See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 461 (describing these two views). Compare 
Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 685 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that Congress delegates to the 
President his authority in immigration law), and Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that executive discretion in immigration is not “boundless”), with 
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc) (characterizing the President’s power to exclude noncitizens as 
“inherent”). Prior to Kleindienst v. Mandel, several exclusion cases had characterized 
Congress’s power to exclude as an “inherent” power, but they also tended to refer to the 
political branches without distinguishing Congress from the Executive. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950). 
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Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of 
aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United 
States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, 
suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or 
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem 
to be appropriate.42 
Presidents have historically used this power to suspend entry by groups of 
noncitizens joined by more than mere nationality.43 For example, President 
Barack Obama suspended entry of noncitizens “who are determined to have 
‘contributed to the situation in Burundi in specified ways”; President Ronald 
Reagan excluded those who arrived “from the high seas.”44 Although prior 
practice indicates that presidents typically define the suspended class with 
greater specificity, § 1182(f) does not, by its own terms, expressly bar 
nationality-based exclusion.45  
Courts have generally regarded executive action in immigration as more 
susceptible to review than legislative action. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the Attorney General’s discretionary denial of a 
waiver of inadmissibility to a noncitizen for the existence of a “facially 
legitimate and bona fide” reason.46 In so doing, it distinguished executive 
discretion from legislative acts more generally.47 Although Mandel concerned 
judicial review of the Attorney General’s discretionary decision rather than an 
executive order articulating criteria for exclusion, courts have applied Mandel 
in other settings, including the travel ban litigation.48  
Apart from the legal background, the factual setting for the travel bans is 
also important. Critics note that President Trump has a long history of 
expressing animus toward people of color and Muslims, during his campaign 
                                                                                                                     
 42 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1995, § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018). 
 43 Indeed, scholars have argued that past practice supports construing § 212(f) as 
applying only to exigent circumstances involving diplomacy or military affairs, where the 
President’s power is greatest. See Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration Law Scholars on the 
Text and Structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act in Support of Respondents at 1–
2, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).  
 44 KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44743, EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO 
EXCLUDE ALIENS: IN BRIEF 7, 10 (2017); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 
155, 187–88 (1993) (upholding legality of executive order establishing policy of Haitian 
interdiction). 
 45 MANUEL, supra note 44, at 1–2. 
 46 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 
 47 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 581 (1990) 
(describing Mandel’s distinction between “executive actions and legislative acts,” the former 
subject to “facially legitimate and bona fide” review and the latter not similarly constrained). 
 48 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795, 798 (1977); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 2392, 2419–20 (2018); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594 
(4th Cir. 2017), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.); Washington v. Trump, 858 
F.3d 1168, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
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and after taking the oath of office.49 In December 2015, candidate-Trump 
proposed a “complete shutdown” of Muslim entry into the United States.50 His 
campaign website featured a “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration,” 
which renewed his call for a complete shutdown.51 That following spring, he 
stated that “Islam hates us.”52 Later that same month, he again proposed shutting 
down Muslim entry.53 After suicide bombings in Brussels, Trump told reporters, 
“You have to deal with the mosques, whether we like it or not, I mean, you know 
these attacks aren’t . . . done by Swedish people.”54 After winning the election, 
the president-elect confirmed his earlier plans.55 He also repeatedly admitted to 
swapping the term “Muslim” for a focus on particular nations to evade 
constitutional scrutiny.56 Finally, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani 
admitted publicly that the President considered the forthcoming policy to be a 
“Muslim ban,” but that the President sought Giuliani’s advice about “do[ing] it 
legally.”57  
All of this culminated in the issuance of the first ban. On January 27, 2017, 
the President’s first Executive Order (EO-1) took effect,58 triggering “chaos” in 
airports across the country.59 Legal permanent residents who were abroad saw 
their green cards canceled upon arrival,60 and other noncitizens arriving in U.S. 
airports lost their right to enter mid-flight.61  
                                                                                                                     
 49 David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Opinion, Donald Trump’s Racism: The 
Definitive List, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/ 
15/opinion/leonhardt-trump-racist.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 594. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline of 
Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-
us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?utm_term=.dc8b86ea3e85 
[https://perma.cc/49JT-8RXZ]. 
 55 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 594. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Exec. Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States, 3. C.F.R, 2017 Comp. 272 (2017) [hereinafter EO-1].  
 59 Katie Bo Williams, Kelly Shoulders Blame for Troubled Travel Ban Rollout, THE 
HILL (Feb. 7, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/318399-kelly-shoulders-
blame-for-troubled-travel-ban-rollout [https://perma.cc/JG6Y-G625] (“Press reports have 
characterized the initial rollout of the ban as chaotic at best, while critics of the ban labeled 
it inhumane at worst.”); see also Michael C. Dorf, Will the Supreme Court Back Trump’s 
Third Attempt at a Travel Ban?, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 25, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/ 
will-supreme-court-back-trumps-third-attempt-travel-ban-790740 [https://perma.cc/SX3U-
47RS]. 
 60 See Weiner & Schemm, supra note 1.  
 61 Trump Executive Order: White House Stands Firm over Travel Ban, BBC NEWS (Jan. 
30, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38790629 [https://perma.cc/DU9W-
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Noncitizens’ families and employers, states, and various interested 
nonprofit organizations immediately challenged the ban. Several federal district 
courts preliminarily enjoined the first ban, in whole or in part.62 In the first 
appellate decision addressing the validity of EO-1, the Ninth Circuit denied the 
government’s motion to stay the district court’s nationwide injunction pending 
appeal of that injunction.63 The appeals court acknowledged the government’s 
substantial authority to regulate immigration but determined that “important 
constitutional limitations” constrained this authority.64 The court concluded that 
the President’s “policy determinations” in immigration law were entitled to 
deference but were not unreviewable.65 The court emphasized EO-1’s impact 
on legal permanent residents,66 who have substantial constitutional rights.67 The 
court determined that the government was unlikely to succeed on appeal and 
that the balance of hardships and the public interest militated against a stay.68 
Thus, the court denied the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal.69 
After courts enjoined EO-1, the President issued a second Executive Order 
(EO-2), this one applying again temporarily, but only to individuals abroad who 
had never received a visa to travel to the United States.70 Individuals affected 
had no right of entry; some commentators argued that they lacked any 
constitutional rights.71 Plaintiffs challenging EO-1 and EO-2 asserted statutory 
                                                                                                                     
4XL5] (“Those who were already mid-flight were detained on arrival - even if they held 
valid US visas or other immigration permits.”). 
 62 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (order granting temporary restraining order); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 
17 Civ. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (order granting 
preliminary injunction). For a complete list of all legal challenges to the travel bans, see 
Litigation Documents, supra note 40.  
 63 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).  
 64 Id. at 1162 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001)). 
 65 Id. at 1164. 
 66 Id. at 1165–66 (discussing EO-1’s impermissible impact on legal permanent  
residents). 
 67 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission 
to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his 
constitutional status changes accordingly.”). 
 68 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1167–68. 
 69 Id. at 1169. 
 70 Exec. Order No. 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States, 3 C.F.R, 2017 Comp. 301, 306–07 [hereinafter EO-2]. 
 71 See Josh Blackman, The Legality of the 3/6/17 Executive Order, Part II: The Due 
Process Clause Analysis, LAWFARE (Mar. 12, 2017), https://lawfareblog.com/legality-3617-
executive-order-part-ii-due-process-clause-analysis [https://perma.cc/C6HS-TD7X].  
However, noncitizens’ lack of a constitutional right to entry does not insulate immigration 
law from judicial scrutiny where those laws impact citizens’ interests. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 
430 U.S. 787, 807 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is irrelevant that aliens have no 
constitutional right to immigrate and that Americans have no constitutional right to compel 
the admission of their families. The essential fact here is that Congress did choose to extend 
such privileges to American citizens but then denied them to a small class of citizens. When 
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and constitutional claims,72 arguing that the federal government, through the 
President, had impermissibly disparaged Muslims as dangerous,73 despite both 
EOs’ ostensible facial neutrality.74 Even before the President promulgated these 
particular travel bans, scholars had argued that the Establishment Clause would 
allow plaintiffs challenging such bans to invoke structural limits on the 
government’s conduct, regardless of whether excluded noncitizens had 
constitutional rights.75 Thus, commentators found the courts’ receptivity to the 
Establishment Clause claim unsurprising.  
Several courts preliminarily enjoined EO-2 as well,76 and the eventual 
appellate decisions expressed two competing visions of Mandel. The Fourth 
Circuit, in affirming the district court’s preliminary injunction against EO-2, 
determined that the President’s campaign fulminations and post-inauguration 
statements disparaging Muslims constituted evidence of his improper purpose 
in enacting EO-2.77 The appeals court initially determined that the President’s 
extensive power to exclude noncitizens had no effect on plaintiffs’ standing to 
assert and likelihood of prevailing on their Establishment Clause claim.78 
Central to the court’s analysis was the President’s long history of campaign 
promises, website language, and tweets regarding the need to “shut down” 
Muslim immigration.79 The court sidestepped the government’s assertion of 
“plenary power” by applying the logical inverse of Justice Kennedy’s 
                                                                                                                     
Congress draws such lines among citizens, the Constitution requires that the decision 
comport with Fifth Amendment principles of equal protection and due process.”). 
 72 Statutory claims included a claim that the travel bans violated INA § 202, which 
prohibits discrimination in the issuance of visas. Constitutional claims included claims under 
the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 32, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 
F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC), aff’d, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir.), 
vacated, No. 17-1194, 2018 WL 1051821 (June 28, 2018) (mem.). 
 73 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Int’l Refugee Assistance 
Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017) (No. 8:17-cv-00361-TDC), aff’d, 883 
F.3d 233 (4th Cir.), vacated, No. 17-1194, 2018 WL 1051821 (June 28, 2018) (mem.). 
 74 Professor Gerald Neuman has argued that EO-1 and EO-2 were not facially neutral, 
considering their multiple references to “honor” killings. See Gerald Neuman, Neither 
Facially Legitimate Nor Bona Fide—Why the Very Text of the Travel Ban Shows It’s 
Unconstitutional, JUST SECURITY (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/41953/facially-legitimate-bona-fide-why-unconstitutional-
travel-ban/ [https://perma.cc/CB5N-LKRE]. 
 75 See Steven Vladeck, What’s Missing from Constitutional Analyses of Donald 
Trump’s Muslim Immigration Ban, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.justsecurit 
y.org/28221/missing-constitutional-analyses-donald-trumps-muslim-immigration-ban/ 
[https://perma.cc/UD8Z-WP74]. 
 76 See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 566 (D. 
Md. 2017), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 
S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). 
 77 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594–95 (4th Cir. 2017), 
vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). 
 78 Id. at 586. 
 79 Id. at 576. 
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conclusion in Kerry v. Din.80 Where plaintiffs had plausibly alleged animus with 
sufficient particularity, as in the instant case, the President’s judgment was not 
entitled to deference.81 Thus, although a national security purpose is “facially 
legitimate,” the President’s own statements evinced bad faith, rendering them 
mere pretext—and certainly not “bona fide.”82 Thus, the court proceeded to 
apply “longstanding Establishment Clause doctrine” to EO-2.83 The Ninth 
Circuit similarly upheld a preliminary injunction against the measure but on 
statutory rather than constitutional grounds.84 The court determined that EO-2 
violated the Immigration and Nationality Act by “exceeding the President’s 
authority under [§ 1182(f)], discriminating on the basis of nationality.”85 
Dissenting judges on both courts decried the majorities’ lack of deference 
to the President. The Fourth Circuit’s dissenters faulted the majority for 
considering extrinsic evidence of purpose.86 On their view, a court cannot 
review a facially neutral EO, and no evidence of purpose, even “smoking gun” 
evidence of animus, may be considered.87 A group of judges on the Ninth 
Circuit expressed similar frustration when the court denied an internal motion 
for rehearing en banc.88 These judges argued that any animus the President 
exhibited should not automatically invalidate the ban because the President also 
claimed to have legitimate reasons for prohibiting the entry of nationals of the 
designated countries.89 On this view, evidence of animus should never lead a 
court to invalidate an executive order that excludes or imposes burdens on select 
noncitizens unless animus is the sole reason for the executive order.90  
Without expressing its view on the merits, the Supreme Court granted the 
government’s motion to stay the injunctions as to noncitizens lacking “any bona 
fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,”91 and, at the close 
                                                                                                                     
 80 Id. at 592; Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015). 
 81 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 592 (Niemeyer, J, dissenting). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 782 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2392.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 647–48. 
 87 Id. at 648 (“In looking behind the face of the government’s action for facts to show 
the alleged bad faith, rather than looking for bad faith on the face of the executive action 
itself, the majority grants itself the power to conduct an extratextual search for evidence 
suggesting bad faith, which is exactly what three Supreme Court opinions have prohibited.”).  
 88 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting in 
the denial of en banc rehearing).  
 89 Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d at 1183 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of en banc 
rehearing) (“So long as there is one ‘facially legitimate and bona fide’ reason for the 
President’s action, our inquiry is at an end.”).  
 90 Id. 
 91 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (finding 
that equities balanced in favor of allowing injunction to take effect with respect to 
noncitizens with “any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,” 
but not with respect to those lacking such a relationship). Notably, the Court did not cite 
authority for this standard, suggesting it was sui generis.  
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of EO-2’s 90-day duration, vacated the Fourth Circuit’s order as moot.92 On 
October 23, 2017, the President issued his third travel ban, this one styled as a 
“Proclamation” rather than an Executive Order.93 The Proclamation stated that 
the President had concluded an extensive study of the security procedures in 
specified countries and found them lacking.94 To address purportedly 
inadequate vetting procedures, he was indefinitely suspending entry from eight 
countries, all majority-Muslim, except for Venezuela and North Korea.95 
Plaintiffs challenged the Proclamation as well, and federal district courts in 
Hawaii and Maryland issued preliminary injunctions.96 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed in part and vacated in part,97 ruling that the indefinite temporal scope 
of the ban and its extensive revision to terrorism-related grounds of 
inadmissibility flouted the careful scheme Congress had created.98 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.99 
In Trump v. Hawaii, a majority of the Justices assumed without deciding 
that they could properly consider the President’s extrinsic statements of 
animus.100 After offering an abridged summary of the President’s anti-Muslim 
animus, the Court then changed the subject, suggesting that presidents speak for 
the nation in a variety of ways, citing Muslim-friendly statements by Presidents 
Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush.101 In so doing, the Court failed to 
consider whether, considering extrinsic statements of animus, the stated national 
                                                                                                                     
 92 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.).  
 93 See Proclamation No. 9645, Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting 
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists 
or Other Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at § 2(d), (f); cf. The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling, Fear, and 
Secrecy, PENN STATE LAW RIGHTS WORKING GRP. 37 n.5 (May 2012), https://pennstatelaw. 
psu.edu/_file/clinics/NSEERS_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4GG-KHLW] (describing  
inclusion of North Korea as a “fig leaf” to “provide political cover” for discriminatory policy 
after the attacks of September 11, 2001).  
 96 Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1155 (D. Haw. 2017) (holding that EO’s 
use of national origin as a proxy for dangerousness violated the INA), aff’d in part and 
vacated in part, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). The Hawaii federal 
court initially issued a TRO, which “converted to a preliminary injunction three days later.” 
See HILLEL R. SMITH & BEN R. HARRINGTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10017, 
OVERVIEW OF ‘TRAVEL BAN’ LITIGATION AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 5 (2018). 
 97 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 622, 702. 
 98 Id. at 673.  
 99 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923, 923–24 (2018) (mem.). The Supreme Court 
requested briefing on the constitutional claim. Id. at 924. In addition, after the certiorari 
grant, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction 
against the Proclamation on constitutional grounds. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 269 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that “the face of the Proclamation, read 
in the context of President Trump’s official statements, fails to demonstrate a primarily 
secular purpose”), vacated, No. 17-1270, 2018 WL 1256938 (2018) (mem.).  
 100 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018). 
 101 Id. at 2417–18. 
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security justifications could still be characterized as “bona fide.”102 Instead of 
requiring the government to disavow the President’s animus,103 the Court 
merely determined that animus was not the sole motive for the bans because the 
President had later articulated a national security rationale.104 Thus, the Court 
concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on their Establishment Clause 
claim.105 Having reached the same conclusion with respect to plaintiffs’ 
statutory claims, the Court reversed the lower court’s grant of a preliminary 
injunction and remanded for further proceedings.106  
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
determined that Mandel applied to individual visa or waiver adjudications, but 
not to a presidential exclusion order.107 She then analyzed the President’s 
animus at greater length.108 Applying traditional Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, she determined that a reasonable observer would understand the 
exclusion order to have the “primary purpose” of expressing anti-Muslim 
hostility.109 Justices Breyer and Kagan also dissented, discerning the exclusion 
order’s unlawful purpose from the waiver provision’s function as mere “window 
dressing.”110 
The Supreme Court’s preliminary resolution of the litigation leaves a 
number of issues unsettled. What is the relevance of the President’s extrinsic 
statements in the analysis, assuming, as the majority did, that the Court has the 
power to “look behind” the face of the order? Will national security always 
defeat animus, no matter how convincing the evidence of illegitimate motive, 
and how flimsy the evidence of a national security rationale? Does the necessity 
or sufficiency of these two motives matter? On remand, courts must determine 
the proper analysis, as the Supreme Court assumed the appropriate framework 
without deciding it. 
                                                                                                                     
 102 See Adam Cox et al., The Radical Supreme Court Travel Ban Opinion—But Why It 
Might Not Apply to Other Immigrants’ Rights Cases, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/58510/radical-supreme-court-travel-ban-opinion-but-apply-
immigrants-rights-cases/ [https://perma.cc/KU4V-MXAQ]. 
 103 The topic of a disavowal arose at oral argument, with Chief Justice Roberts asking 
whether a disavowal of animus now would cure the constitutional defect; plaintiffs’ counsel 
conceded that it would. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).  
 104 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421 (characterizing as “legitimate” the 
Proclamation’s purpose of “preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately 
vetted.”). 
 105 Id. at 2423. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 2440 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 108 Id. at 2443. 
 109 Id. at 2445. 
 110 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Immigration law’s “plenary power” doctrine, first announced in the 
nineteenth century Chinese Exclusion Case,111 has traditionally required 
deference to congressional judgments—including animus112 —but subsequent 
developments in constitutional law have raised doubts about the legality and 
desirability of such a result.113 When analyzing how direct evidence of animus 
alters deference, a court faces the question not merely of whether to defer, but 
to what extent.114 If impermissible motive matters at all, a reviewing court will 
have to select a motive standard.115 In his illuminating study of mixed motive 
standards across the law, Professor Andrew Verstein argues that the multitude 
of motive standards that courts use generally correspond to only four standards: 
sole, but-for, primary, and any.116 “Sole motive” favors defendants strongly, as 
it leads a court to invalidate a law only where an improper motive—such as 
racial animus—is the “sole motive” for the challenged act.117 The presence of 
any proper motive, thus, leads to a defense victory. The “but-for” motive 
standard also favors the defense and supports invalidation only where an 
improper motive is necessary.118 The “primary motive” standard requires only 
that the plaintiff prove that the improper motive was greater in magnitude than 
the proper motive, even if both reasons are sufficient on their own.119 Thus, a 
plaintiff could recover based on a defendant’s impermissible racial animus, even 
if the defendant would have made the same decision anyway, so long as 
defendant’s racial animus exceeds its non-racist motive. Finally, the “any 
motive” standard favors plaintiffs, as it supports invalidation upon a showing of 
“taint,” the existence of any improper motive behind the challenged act.120  
The travel ban litigation in the lower courts revealed two conflicting 
approaches to deference amid direct evidence of animus, and unsurprisingly, 
judges’ choice of a motive standard governed the result. Judge Bybee and other 
                                                                                                                     
 111 The Chinese Exclusion Case involved a challenge to an Act of Congress. See Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599–600 (1889). 
 112 Id. at 596; see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that Congress is responsible for immigration laws, even 
if those laws reflect “xenophobia generally”). 
 113 For one, the Equal Protection Clause had not yet been read into the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to apply to the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497 (1954); see also Kagan, supra note 24, at 90 (arguing that immigration law’s 
tolerance for animus has diminished but remains uncertain). 
 114 Cf. Horwitz, supra note 21, at 1066 (“The relationship between deference and the 
law’s contextual dilemma is complex. But it is clear that there is an intimate relationship 
between these two phenomena.”).  
 115 Cf. Richard Fallon, Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
523, 529 (2016) (arguing that courts should never invalidate laws “solely because of the 
subjective intentions of those who enacted it”) (emphasis added). 
 116 Verstein, supra note 36, at 1159. 
 117 Id. at 1139. 
 118 Id. at 1137. 
 119 Id. at 1134. 
 120 Id. at 1141.  
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dissenting judges on the Ninth Circuit endorsed a “sole motive” standard, which 
upholds an exclusion law unless animus is the sole motive.121 This standard 
assures a government victory in nearly all cases, for the government can almost 
always articulate a post-hoc rationalization for a discriminatory law.122 This 
view guts Mandel by requiring only facial legitimacy, thus representing one 
extreme on the deference spectrum. The other extreme, exemplified by the 
majority decision in IRAP v. Trump, however, strips the government of 
deference upon a showing of any animus.123 Although this might sound like a 
“but-for” test, further analysis reveals it resembles the “taint” theory more 
closely: good faith is a precondition for deference, and the presence of any 
animus means the precondition has not been met.124 This motive standard in 
connection with exclusion, however, risks exposing sensitive political 
judgments to an exacting level of scrutiny—one that the Supreme Court has 
suggested is better suited for a discriminatory state law rather than a presidential 
exclusion order.125 Thus, the travel ban litigation displays two approaches to 
analyzing the fundamental question running through challenges to successive 
EOs.  
The Supreme Court’s resolution, too, rested on choice of motive 
standard.126 In allowing a post-hoc national security justification to immunize 
an order otherwise infected with animus, the Court adopted the “sole motive” 
standard described above.127 The Court’s application of this standard, however, 
                                                                                                                     
 121 See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc); cf. Verstein, supra note 36, at 1139–41 (describing the 
sole motive standard). 
 122 Other judges have questioned the use of extrinsic evidence of animus, but for reasons 
explained below, our constitutional jurisprudence allows reliance on such evidence, 
especially when vindicating equality interests. Cf. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 
857 F.3d 554, 648 (4th Cir. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting), vacating as moot, 138 S. Ct. 
353 (2017) (mem.). 
 123 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591. The majority characterized 
EO-2 as “solely” motivated by animus, but the court did not engage in any analysis regarding 
the quantum of animus vis-à-vis stated reasons for the ban, such as national security. As a 
result, the court did not engage in a mixed motives inquiry, instead adopting an all-or-nothing 
approach. Any showing of animus meant the entire motive was animus. Professor Fallon 
argues that courts should subject a challenged statute to heightened scrutiny where legislators 
have breached their “deliberative obligations” by pursuing “constitutionally forbidden aims 
or . . . tak[ing] official actions based on constitutionally forbidden motives,” specifically 
where greater than half the legislators have forbidden subjective intent. See Fallon, supra 
note 115, at 530. On this reasoning, a unitary actor, the President, possessing a forbidden 
subjective intent might similarly render the “norms of deference” inapplicable. Id. 
 124 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591.  
 125 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 375 (1971) (holding that state laws limiting welfare benefits to citizens violate 
noncitizens’ rights to equal protection). 
 126 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 127 Id.  
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undermines its stated power to consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence.128 That is, 
the Court “considered” plaintiffs’ evidence by actually considering only the 
government’s evidence. Once the government articulated a national security 
objective and offered supporting facts, the plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence did not 
matter at all. This turns Mandel on its head, allowing the government to 
demonstrate the “bona fide” nature of its “facially legitimate” reason without 
considering any facts showing that the stated reason is a sham. Moreover, in 
selecting the “sole motive” standard, the Court mischaracterized a number of 
cases—principally Korematsu,129 but also the Equal Protection animus cases.130 
Justice Sotomayor’s rival analysis calls for examining the allegations with 
clear eyes,131 but her use of the “primary purpose” standard is similarly 
vulnerable to critique. Although it differs slightly from the “taint” standard used 
by the Fourth Circuit in IRAP v. Trump, it rejects deference and calls for 
invalidation when animus predominates over legitimate justifications. Although 
a reasonable approach, it overlooks the possibility that an exclusion order can 
have more than one independently sufficient justification. Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their Establishment 
Clause claim is vulnerable on many counts, and the need remains for a 
compelling analysis of plenary power and animus. 
III. PLENARY POWER DEFERENCE 
Understanding the role of deference in immigration law132 requires 
explaining the concept of deference generally and briefly retelling the history of 
the so-called “plenary power doctrine.” Since its origins in the nineteenth 
century, the plenary power doctrine has taken on different meanings: initially, it 
meant absolute federal power over borders, as well as the nonjusticiability of 
challenges to immigration law.133 Through the twentieth century, it evolved 
from strict nonjusticiability to a highly deferential standard of review. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court has ruled that it will uphold decisions excluding 
noncitizens from entry so long as the government advances a “facially legitimate 
                                                                                                                     
 128 Id. (“[W]e assume that we may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent 
of applying rational basis review.”).  
 129 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
 130 See infra Part IV. 
 131 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433–35 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 132 I am referring here to constitutional deference, not other forms of deference, such as 
courts’ deference to agency interpretations of statutes under the Chevron doctrine. Cf. Daniel 
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. 
Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 707 (1997) (describing the “extraordinary 
constitutional deference” the Court gives to Congress and the Executive in immigration 
matters). 
 133 NEUMAN, supra note 18, at 138. In the travel ban litigation, the government has 
argued that the President’s exclusion decisions are unreviewable by the judiciary.  
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and bona fide” reason for the exclusion.134 While developments in constitutional 
law over the last century have eroded the plenary power doctrine’s scope, 
especially as to procedural due process claims and challenges to indefinite 
detention,135 courts have not extended these developments to first-time visa 
applicants with no existing ties to the United States—the very population 
excluded by the President’s revised travel ban.136  
Before defining deference and tracing the path of the plenary power 
doctrine, it is important to note that both the courts and Congress circumscribe 
the President’s role in exclusion law. Congress possesses principal authority to 
regulate immigration.137 The Chinese Exclusion Case announced plenary power 
in the course of considering the validity of a congressional act.138 Although the 
Supreme Court has not always clearly distinguished between congressional and 
presidential authority in immigration law,139 the Court has repeatedly noted that 
“over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete.”140 Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez have argued that 
Congress’s power vis-à-vis the President is greater at the “front end,” when 
screening noncitizens for admission, while the President’s power is greater at 
the “back end,” when selecting noncitizens for removal.141 Thus, while 
Congress has tremendous latitude in defining the criteria of admission and 
removal, the President retains significant discretion to determine the proper 
targets for removal.142 Ultimately, the President’s delegated authority in the 
realm of exclusion is a small part of a comprehensive legislative scheme,143 but 
the President’s responsibilities in foreign, diplomatic, and military affairs have 
often led courts to defer to the President’s judgments in immigration law as well. 
For this reason, a full discussion of the evolution of plenary power is useful. 
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A. Defining Deference 
Deference is born of discretion. “[D]iscretion is the power given to a person 
with authority to choose between two or more alternatives, when each of the 
alternatives is lawful.”144 Discretion would be illusory without deference, as 
courts could nullify an actor’s choice without granting that actor the flexibility 
or discretion they are supposed to have.  
Deference is “a decisionmaker following a determination made by some 
other individual or institution that it might not otherwise have reached had it 
decided the same question independently.”145 In essence, deference is where a 
decisionmaker sets aside “its own judgment” and follows “the judgment of 
another decisionmaker . . . in circumstances in which the deferring 
decisionmaker . . . might have reached a different decision.”146 Scholars have 
identified two bases of deference: legal authority and expertise.147 Deference 
based on legal authority is a “status-based” justification and appears, for 
example, when courts are reviewing judgments of the political branches or 
administrative agencies.148 On this view, judicial deference to agencies is based 
primarily on Congress’s implied delegation of lawmaking power to agencies, 
thus exemplifying “legal authority” deference.149 Deference based on expertise, 
or “epistemic authority,” on the other hand, refers to the superior knowledge of 
the decisionmaker receiving deference, or its “comparative institutional 
competence.”150  
“Norms of deference” typically require decisionmakers to act in good 
faith,151 while animus reveals bad faith.152 Thus, if good faith is a precondition 
of deference, animus could very well defeat deference. Whether a good faith 
requirement makes sense as a prerequisite to deference depends on what work 
deference is doing. When an entity’s expertise drives a court’s deference, a court 
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seeks to permit the presumptively superior judgment of the entity to prevail, to 
avoid second-guessing a judgment call.153 Thus, a consular official reviewing a 
visa application is entitled to deference because of her superior knowledge of 
local conditions and expertise in adjudicating visas.154 Accordingly, a court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the consular official absent a showing of 
bad faith.155 Where the whole point of deference is to enable better policy-
making, or better individual decisions, it makes sense to reduce or even 
eliminate deference when the evidence shows that the decisionmaker is 
motivated by bad faith.156 
When structural considerations dominate a court’s deference, however, a 
court applies only the mildest form of judicial review in order to preserve space 
for “rough-hewn”157 measures that make no pretense of being better policy, but 
instead, reflect legal judgments about the allocation of power.158 Here, an 
implied good faith requirement makes less sense because the rationale for 
deference is not to enhance the quality of policy or individual decisions; instead, 
deference functions simply to honor an allocation of responsibility between 
branches of the government.159 Decisions entrusted to the President are 
entrusted to him, regardless of how he executes them.160 Given the dual nature 
of deference to the President in immigration law, based both on expertise and 
legal authority, a good faith requirement is plausible but not inevitably 
correct.161  
Immigration deference follows from the political branches’ discretion.162 
When actors—whether the President or a prosecutor—have discretion to make 
judgments, to carefully balance a range of factors, courts typically scrutinize 
those actors’ decisions less rigorously.163 Courts defer to decisions made in 
another actor’s lawful exercise of discretion.164 Those actors are given the 
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flexibility and freedom to arrive at the result they think best.165 Immigration 
deference in part recognizes the need for the President and Congress to use their 
discretion without the judiciary’s intrusion,166 and this discretion to establish 
exclusion criteria is best illustrated by the nineteenth and twentieth century 
plenary power cases. 
B. Plenary Power in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
The Supreme Court established the plenary power doctrine in Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, also known as the Chinese Exclusion Case.167 Ping was a 
Chinese national who had lived in San Francisco for a dozen years, arriving well 
before the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.168 In 1868, the United States had 
entered into a treaty with China to permit migration by Chinese nationals such 
as him.169 However, racism and fears of economic competition fueled domestic 
frustration with Chinese immigration, prompting Congress to pass the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882, suspending immigration of additional Chinese 
laborers.170 Before leaving on a visit to China in 1887, Ping obtained a 
certificate, to which he was entitled, to ensure reentry to the United States.171 
One week before his return to the United States in 1888, however, Congress 
passed the Scott Act, declaring all reentry certificates invalid, and barring all 
Chinese laborers from re-entering the country.172 Accordingly, when Ping 
arrived on a ship at the port of San Francisco, the shipmaster detained him.173 
Ping filed a habeas corpus action, and the lower courts denied his petition.174 
The Supreme Court, upon review, held that Ping had no right to enter based on 
his certificate, the United States’ treaty commitment notwithstanding, because 
Congress had overridden his authorization with the Scott Act.175 In a decision 
with numerous references to the inherent authority of sovereign nations to 
control their borders, as well as racist language decrying the Chinese as 
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unassimilable, the Court determined that it lacked the power to decide questions 
regarding the validity of the statute, even amid claims that the statute violated 
an earlier treaty commitment.176 The Court described Congress’s expansive 
exclusion power, reasoning:  
That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative 
department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do 
not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent 
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it 
could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of 
another power.177  
The Court further quoted an earlier decision of Chief Justice Marshall, 
noting that the jurisdiction of the United States within its own territory “is 
susceptible of no limitation not imposed of by itself.”178 Viewing migration as 
a matter between sovereigns, the United States’ decision to cede control would 
effectively transfer power to another sovereign.179 The Court further referenced 
both the Legislature’s and the Executive’s longstanding power to exclude 
foreigners, but this act of combining the political branches, or speaking of them 
as though their powers were coextensive, was carefully dismantled only 
paragraphs later.180 Specifically, the Court distinguished the Chinese Exclusion 
Act from a contemporaneous law that granted the President the authority to 
expel dangerous noncitizens, noting that the latter “was passed during a period 
of great political excitement,” “was never brought to the test of judicial decision 
in the courts of the United States,” and regardless, was not before the Court 
presently.181  
Scholars have argued that, despite numerous references to sovereignty, the 
Chinese Exclusion Case is not about sovereignty.182 The dominant interest, 
instead, is federalism, specifically, establishing federal primacy vis-à-vis the 
states in making and enforcing immigration law.183 However, emphasizing 
federalism over sovereignty does not defeat the “absolute power” interpretation 
of plenary power that the Chinese Exclusion Case advances.184 
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The Supreme Court continued interpreting plenary power as “absolute 
power” in a number of cases throughout the twentieth century, relying on a mix 
of national security and inherent authority justifications. In Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court held that an immigration regulation authorized 
the Attorney General to exclude a foreign wife of an American veteran husband 
on national security grounds without notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to 
respond, even though Congress had provided for the admission of such wives 
under the War Brides Act.185 The Court observed that the political branches’ 
“inherent authority” to exclude noncitizens emanated from its power to control 
the nation’s foreign affairs.186 Thus, during a national emergency, Congress 
could properly delegate that power to the President, and in so doing, it could 
authorize a “broad exercise” of power, even if it seemingly conflicted with a 
statute granting the privilege of entry.187 In a famous encapsulation of the 
plenary power doctrine’s vast reach at the time, the Court ruled, “Whatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied 
entry is concerned.”188 Such a rule licenses Congress to define its own 
constraints, with a promise of nonjusticiability to boot. Unsurprisingly, this 
conception of due process prompted multiple dissents.  
The dissenting Justices interpreted the War Brides Act not to permit the 
Attorney General to exclude the foreign wife of an American veteran husband 
without traditional due process protections.189 Justice Frankfurter reasoned that, 
through the War Brides Act, Congress intended to extend the privilege of entry 
to the foreign brides of American veterans of World War II.190 He found it 
improbable that the exclusion regulation permitted the Attorney General to 
exclude Knauff, considering the statute.191 Justice Jackson invoked the 
avoidance canon of statutory interpretation, concluding that “Congress will have 
to use much more explicit language” to authorize breaking up an American 
citizen’s family and finding “serious misconduct” by his noncitizen wife 
without notice, evidence, and an opportunity to be heard.192  
Similarly, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the Supreme Court 
upheld the permanent exclusion and indefinite detention of a noncitizen, without 
a hearing, based on secret information.193 Mezei hailed from Romania and had 
lived for many years in Buffalo, New York, with his American citizen wife.194 
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He left the United States to visit his dying mother in Eastern Europe and returned 
after nineteen months.195 Although Mezei succeeded in obtaining a visa from 
Europe to travel to the United States, he was temporarily excluded upon 
arrival.196 Instead of admitting Mezei, the government detained him at Ellis 
Island pending the Attorney General’s final decision.197 Once the Attorney 
General deemed him permanently excludable, again, without a hearing, and 
based on secret evidence, the government tried to find a third country to take 
him.198 None would.199 Accordingly, Mezei remained stranded at Ellis Island 
indefinitely.200 The Court described detention powers during times of national 
emergency as expansive and coextensive with the power to exclude.201 The 
Court determined that Mezei had broken his continuing presence in the United 
States, thus rendering him an excludable noncitizen rather than a returning 
permanent resident entitled to greater constitutional protections.202 
Notwithstanding Mezei’s actual detention on U.S. soil, i.e., at Ellis Island, the 
Court regarded him as not yet “on the threshold,” thus outside the scope of 
constitutional protection.203 
The dissenters acknowledged the vast power to exclude but deemed 
unconstitutional Mezei’s indefinite detention without procedural due process. In 
his stirring dissent, Justice Jackson argued that preventive detention itself did 
not violate substantive due process, but that indefinite detention of individuals 
based on future dangerousness, determined by secret evidence and without a 
hearing, was unconstitutional, even for an excludable noncitizen.204 This view 
suggests that even excludable noncitizens might have a procedural due process 
right to know the basis of their continued detention, even if not a right to 
challenge substantive exclusion provisions.205  
The Knauff and Mezei view of plenary power as absolute tolerates outright 
animus,206 but a series of cases subsequently revealed a potential role for 
judicial review of substantive removal criteria. In Harisiades, the Court rejected 
First Amendment and Fifth Amendment challenges to the Alien Registration 
Act as applied to a long-time resident of the United States and Greek national 
whom the government sought to deport for past membership in the Communist 
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Party.207 The Court ruled that the expulsion of long-time resident noncitizens, 
“a practice that bristles with severities,” was nonetheless an important foreign 
policy tool “inherent in every sovereign state,”208 and that the Court could not 
declare “congressional alarm” about the Communist threat “a fantasy or a 
pretense.”209 This language suggests, however, that were a congressional 
enactment to lack any basis in fact, judicial review might be warranted, thus 
distinguishing the view from an “absolute power” view.210 Moreover, the Court 
held that immigration statutes are “largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference,”211 suggesting the possibility of some judicial involvement.212 
The opinions in Harisiades captured the full spectrum of the debate. In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter described the exclusion power as 
virtually boundless:213  
But whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may 
have reflected xenophobia in general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the 
responsibility belongs to Congress. Courts do enforce the requirements 
imposed by Congress upon officials in administering immigration laws . . . and 
the requirement of Due Process may entail certain procedural observances . . . . 
But the underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to enter 
and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay, are for Congress exclusively 
to determine even though such determination may be deemed to offend 
American traditions and may, as has been the case, jeopardize peace.214 
Critically, Justice Frankfurter spoke of Congress, not the President.215 
However, the Supreme Court has not always distinguished Congress and the 
President when discussing the federal immigration power.216 Regardless, 
Justice Frankfurter’s description of “crude and cruel” immigration laws217 
perfectly captures the costs of immigration deference—the potential for poor 
design, harsh impact, as well as animus.  
In contrast, the dissenting Justices characterized the removal power as one 
implied from sovereignty, and thus, subservient to the express guarantees of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.218 Expressing skepticism about the 
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very notion of “inherent authority,” the dissent rejected the notion of a 
permanent taint from, in this case, past membership in the Communist Party.219 
Specifically, the dissenters rejected the majority’s conclusive presumption that 
past membership means a person is “forever dangerous to our society.”220 The 
dissent specifically rejected the view of Congress’s deportation power as 
substantively boundless, noting that absolute power would be “inconsistent with 
the philosophy of constitutional law which we have developed for the protection 
of resident aliens.”221 
Decades later, the Supreme Court articulated a much more robust, albeit still 
highly deferential, vision of judicial review of the Attorney General’s 
discretionary decision to exclude a noncitizen. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the 
Court upheld the Attorney General’s decision not to waive a finding of a 
noncitizen’s inadmissibility because the Attorney General had offered a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for the waiver denial.222 In that case, 
Ernest Mandel, a renowned Marxist professor, had obtained a visa to speak at 
Stanford and other universities during a trip to the United States.223 On previous 
trips, he had unwittingly violated the terms of his visa.224 Everyone, including 
the Supreme Court, seemed to understand the real reason was the Attorney 
General’s distaste for his Marxist views.225 Even though “bona fide” can mean 
“genuine” and “in good faith,”226 the Court declined to consider possible 
pretext.227 Instead, it accepted the government’s explanation for the denial, here 
that Mandel had previously violated the terms of his visas.228 Such a reason 
would insulate a consular officer’s decision from further scrutiny.229 
The Supreme Court cases that discuss Mandel have reaffirmed the 
standard’s limited strength. In Fiallo v. Bell, the Court upheld the validity of a 
statute that conditioned an immigration benefit on both the sex of the parent and 
the legitimacy of the parent-child relationship, which plaintiffs assailed as 
“‘double-barreled’ discrimination.”230 In that case, Congress made an 
immigration privilege available to illegitimate children of American citizen 
mothers or foreign mothers of illegitimate citizen children, but not to 
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illegitimate children of American citizen fathers or foreign fathers of 
illegitimate citizen children.231 Rejecting Equal Protection and Due Process 
challenges, the Court ruled that Congress’s plenary power in immigration law 
authorized its use of illegitimacy as a rough measure of the closeness of ties 
between fathers and illegitimate children.232 Thus, the Court has applied the 
Mandel standard to a federal statute, albeit not in the exclusion context, and not 
simply to individual consular decisions.233 
The Supreme Court’s other discussion of Mandel prior to the travel ban 
litigation occurred in Kerry v. Din.234 In that case, Din, a U.S. citizen, sought to 
compel an explanation for the denial of a visa to her Afghan husband, but the 
Court rejected Din’s claim.235 In its visa denial, the U.S. State Department cited 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), which renders inadmissible any noncitizen who has 
engaged in terrorist activity,236 but the explanation offered no details as to what 
activity her husband had engaged in or what evidence the government had 
considered.237 Applying Mandel, Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion 
reasoned that Din had received a reason that was “facially legitimate and bona 
fide.”238 Citing a statutory basis of ineligibility constituted a “facially 
legitimate” reason because Congress has plenary power to define the grounds 
of inadmissibility, and the consular officer cited one of these grounds.239 The 
citation to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) also satisfied the requirement for a “bona 
fide factual basis” because the statute defines factual predicates.240 Even though 
the State Department had given the plaintiff in Mandel a much more detailed 
description of the basis of his visa denial, i.e., his noncompliance with the 
conditions of his prior visas, Mandel involved a provision granting the Attorney 
General “nearly unbridled discretion” to adjudicate waivers.241 In contrast, the 
State Department had applied a statutory ground for inadmissibility in the Din 
Case.242 Justice Kennedy also noted that Din had admitted that her husband had 
worked for the Taliban, which provided “at least a facial connection to terrorist 
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activity.”243 Crucially, he noted that the Court lacked the authority to “look 
behind” the government’s stated reason for denying Din’s husband’s visa, 
“[a]bsent an affirmative showing of bad faith on the part of the consular officer 
who denied [Din’s husband] a visa,” “plausibly alleged with sufficient 
particularity.”244 Notably absent from Mandel, Fiallo, and Din was any direct 
evidence of government animus.  
C. Plenary Power and Equal Protection 
Modern plenary power doctrine has receded with respect to procedural due 
process, and to some extent, equal protection. Specifically, the Supreme Court 
has applied equal protection’s rational basis review to federal alienage 
classifications.245 However, beyond these settings, courts have avoided issuing 
explicitly constitutional decisions announcing the scope of immigrants’ 
rights.246 In particular, courts evaluating noncitizens’ equal protection 
challenges to immigration laws (as opposed to non-immigration laws that 
distinguish on the basis of alienage) have relied on the constitutional avoidance 
canon to interpret the relevant statutes or regulations as not authorizing 
discrimination.247 For example, in Jean v. Nelson, a class of Haitian asylum 
seekers challenged the practice of the Immigration and Nationality Service 
(INS) to detain all arriving Haitians.248 The asylum seekers asserted a range of 
claims, statutory and constitutional,249 including that the INS’s implementation 
of the parole regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause.250 The district 
court granted the asylum seekers’ statutory claim,251 and the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed on constitutional grounds.252 Rehearing the case en banc, the Eleventh 
Circuit determined that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of Due Process did 
not apply to “unadmitted” noncitizens, considering the government’s plenary 
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authority to control its borders.253 Upon review, the Supreme Court determined 
that the INS parole regulations did not authorize race or national origin 
discrimination, thus obviating the need to reach the constitutional question.254 
Instead, the Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and remanded to the 
district court to consider whether INS officers were in fact honoring the 
regulation’s race neutrality.255 In dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan decried 
the majority’s failure to provide a constitutional remedy.256 The dissent further 
rejected broad dicta from Mezei suggesting that “an undocumented alien 
detained at the border does not enjoy any constitutional protections,” noting that 
this dicta “can withstand neither the weight of logic nor that of principle, and 
has never been incorporated into the fabric of our constitutional 
jurisprudence.”257  
Other cases have indicated, without expressly holding, that noncitizens lack 
constitutional protection from selective enforcement. In Reno v. American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, for example, noncitizens sought to enjoin 
deportation proceedings against them because the Attorney General had 
allegedly targeted them for deportation due to their political affiliation with the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.258 Such targeting, they claimed, 
violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights.259 While the Attorney General 
was appealing the district court’s grant of an injunction to the noncitizens, 
Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to 
review a range of decisions by the Attorney General.260 The Supreme Court 
decided that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the selective enforcement 
claim.261 Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that selective enforcement claims are 
especially rare and weak because they “invade a special province of the 
Executive—its prosecutorial discretion.”262 In dicta, the Court denied that 
noncitizens had any constitutional right to assert a selective enforcement claim, 
emphasizing the importance of Executive discretion in this realm and the “less 
compelling” interests of noncitizens who are deportable regardless.263 However, 
Justice Scalia reserved judgment on “the possibility of a rare case in which the 
alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing 
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considerations can be overcome.”264 Thus, although noncitizens generally have 
no constitutional right against selective enforcement, it remains an open 
question whether noncitizens with direct evidence of animus might persuade the 
federal courts to intervene.  
Plaintiffs lacking direct evidence of animus continued to fail in challenging 
immigration regulations on equal protection grounds after the attacks against 
the United States on September 11, 2001. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1303(a), the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) instituted the National Security Entry-
Exit Registration System (NSEERS) for male noncitizens from specified 
countries, almost all Muslim or Arab.265 Those found not in compliance with 
existing immigration laws were placed in deportation proceedings.266 Civil 
liberties groups challenged NSEERS, but no court invalidated the program.267 
In Rajah v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit rejected petitioners’ equal protection 
claim specifically.268 The court recognized the political branches’ broad power 
in immigration and noted that only rational basis review applied to the special 
registration regulation.269 Considering the national security threat that 9/11 
revealed, the government could rationally require foreign nationals, Muslim and 
non-Muslim, from majority-Muslim countries to register without offending the 
Constitution.270 The NSEERS challengers, however, lacked direct evidence of 
animus, and the regulation’s mere focus on foreign nationals from Muslim or 
Arab countries failed to support an inference of that form of hostility.271 
Despite numerous failed equal protection challenges to immigration laws, 
and the Supreme Court’s “green light” to animus-based exclusion policy in its 
initial resolution of the travel ban litigation,272 the proper framework for 
analyzing plenary power and animus requires greater clarification. Accordingly, 
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it becomes important to assess what benefits deference brings and what costs it 
imposes.  
D. The Costs and Benefits of Plenary Power Deference 
Deference in the immigration context has specific costs and benefits. It 
grants the President flexibility to respond to international events,273 but it also 
promotes lazy, imprecise policies, including policies based on stereotypes rather 
than evidence.274 While defenders of plenary power deference regard these 
policies as valuable “rough-hewn” measures,275 others decry their harsh, often 
unjust results.276 Consider, now, the principal benefits and costs of deference to 
the President’s exclusion of noncitizens. 
The most celebrated benefit of immigration deference is the flexibility it 
grants the political branches to conduct foreign affairs and respond to 
international developments.277 Under the traditional understanding of plenary 
power deference, the political branches may use immigration restrictions as 
tools for conducting foreign affairs.278 As noted above, Congress has delegated 
exclusion power to the President,279 and the President has used this power at 
various points over the last several decades to impose a targeted suspension on 
entry of people who had engaged in specific proscribed conduct.280 Even outside 
of the exclusion context, examples of “productive” executive deference abound. 
President Carter used his authority under INA § 215 (8 U.S.C. § 1185) to recall 
Iranian students during the hostage crisis at the American embassy in Tehran.281 
Under the circumstances, no matter how tenuous the link between recalling 
Iranian students and pressuring the Iranians holding Americans as hostages, the 
President’s use of this authority was widely viewed as a justified, useful “rough-
hewn” measure.282 For reasons echoing the political question doctrine, courts 
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typically decline to disturb Congress’s choice of exclusion and removal criteria 
or the President’s exercise of power delegated under the INA, and this allows 
the political branches to use immigration restrictions as tools in conducting 
foreign affairs.283  
Granting the President and Congress such latitude, however, comes at a 
cost. It enables the political branches to promulgate inefficient policies based on 
lazy thinking. In Demore v. Kim, for example, the Supreme Court recognized 
Congress’s substantial discretion to manage the removal of noncitizens.284 The 
question before the Court was the constitutionality of mandatory detention 
without individualized bond hearings to consider the traditional criteria for civil 
detention, namely, dangerousness and flight risk.285 Instead of providing for the 
hearings, Congress essentially presumed all removable noncitizens with certain 
criminal convictions to be dangerous or flight risks.286 Invoking the plenary 
power doctrine, the Court upheld the mandatory detention statute as applied to 
legal permanent residents, citing the latitude Congress enjoys in the immigration 
context.287 The Court explicitly stated that when it comes to immigrants, 
Congress can legislate less precisely, thus tolerating inefficiency, waste, and 
loosely-justified legislation.288  
The NSEERS special registration program, discussed above, also illustrates 
the costs of executive discretion. The program targeted men from Arab and 
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predominantly Muslim countries, later adding North Korea as a “fig leaf.”289 It 
focused on men based on the demographics of the 9/11 hijackers, thereby 
implementing a national racial profiling policy.290 This produced lasting harm 
to families and communities.291 For example, the program separated family 
members from deported male relatives, often the primary income-earners, thus 
subjecting the remaining family members to considerable hardship or even 
homelessness.292 Moreover, serious questions arose about the efficacy of the 
program, as studies show it produced not a single terrorism-related conviction, 
although the Bush Administration maintained that information about the 
program was “classified” and that NSEERS had helped identify nearly a dozen 
“terrorism suspects.”293  
Thus, deference to the President in immigration matters imposes costs as 
well as benefits on society. When confronted with presidential animus, such as 
that associated with President Trump’s travel bans,294 courts must consider how 
to capture the benefits of deference—the legitimate functions of presidential 
discretion in matters relating to foreign affairs—while minimizing the costs, 
namely animus-laced policies doing serious injustice.  
IV. THE IMPACT OF ANIMUS: EQUAL PROTECTION, RELIGION CLAUSES, 
AND VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION 
Forbidden government intent encompasses racial and religious animus and 
takes a variety of forms.295 Courts routinely determine what effect direct 
evidence of animus should have, but they rarely consider its effect when they 
owe special deference to a decisionmaker expressing animus. This Part defines 
“animus” and describes how courts analyze animus under the Equal Protection 
Clause incorporated into the Fifth Amendment and the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment.296 It then considers the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion as 
an analogy to plenary power deference. It focuses specifically on the claim of 
vindictive prosecution, a claim based on due process that allows a criminal 
defendant to seek dismissal of charges brought by a prosecutor due to animus. 
Current jurisprudence shows that, once a criminal defendant proffers direct 
evidence of animus, the prosecutor must then prove that animus was not 
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necessary to the decision to bring charges.297 In other words, the prosecutor 
must prove that animus was not a “but-for” cause of the charges. Vindictive 
prosecution offers a compelling analogy to claims of presidential animus in 
immigration law because it contains two crucial elements: a deference or 
discretion doctrine and direct evidence of animus.298 On this analogy, even a 
decisionmaker with tremendous discretion and authority is nonetheless 
accountable for improper motive. By analogy to vindictive prosecution, courts 
confronting claims of discriminatory exclusion due to presidential animus 
should similarly adopt a mixed motives framework using a “but-for” motive 
standard. 
A. The Equal Protection Backdrop 
Equal protection jurisprudence allows a court to invalidate a facially neutral 
law if a forbidden government intent, such as racial animus, is a motivating 
factor.299 Although scholars have persuasively argued for refocusing judicial 
attention toward substantive norms and away from lawmakers’ subjective 
motives or biases,300 existing precedent allows courts to consider animus and 
call lawmakers to account when it appears. 
1. Defining “Animus” 
Animus generally means “a usually prejudiced and often spiteful or 
malevolent ill will.”301 The concept encompasses hostility, rivalry, opposition, 
and antipathy.302 In the equal protection context, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted “animus” to mean a “desire to harm,” the existence of private bias, 
or fear based on stereotypes.303 Animus may also appear as “expressing an 
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ideology of white supremacy.”304 Professor William Araiza links the concept of 
“animus” to the classic problem of factionalism, which manifested in the 
nineteenth century as “class legislation,” or legislation passed to achieve private 
rather than public ends.305 Professor Araiza has also persuasively linked animus 
to subordination, understood as the burdening of a group without a “plausible 
public-welfare justification.”306 The concept of dignity further clarifies the 
meaning of animus, for a “common feature of the animus cases is that they 
feature [a] denial of equal human status.”307 As for the effects of animus, its 
presence is generally the only reason for which a law will fail rational basis 
review.308  
Scholars have lamented the courts’ failure to define animus, what 
constitutes evidence of animus, and what impact a finding of animus will have 
on a legal challenge.309 The concept, in short, is radically “undertheorized.”310 
The United States’ history of race-based slavery, wartime detention, and 
nativism makes racial animus a core concern of the federal courts,311 but 
research also suggests that animus can have a detrimental effect on social 
function in the present day.312 When a law embodies or implements animus, it 
stands to impede social function.313 Thus, while constitutional jurisprudence 
does not clearly define animus and its effects, the concept remains important, 
and a finding of animus can lead a court to invalidate a law.  
2. The Impact of Animus on a Facially Neutral Law 
Noncitizens within the United States are entitled to equal protection of the 
laws, and evidence that government officials are applying a facially neutral law 
in a racially discriminatory way may lead to its invalidation. In Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that a facially neutral municipal ordinance 
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regulating laundries in San Francisco violated equal protection because 
administrators enforced the law in a manner that discriminated against Chinese 
immigrants.314 In that case, 200 Chinese immigrants had been denied licenses 
to operate laundries, despite satisfying all relevant criteria, while eighty 
similarly situated non-Chinese persons had successfully obtained laundry 
licenses.315 The city admitted that it denied the licenses based on race. The Court 
held:  
No reason for [the denial of licenses to Chinese applicants] is shown, and the 
conclusion cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except hostility to the 
race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which, in the eye of 
the law, is not justified. The discrimination is therefore illegal, and the public 
administration which enforces it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws 
and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.316  
Yick Wo demonstrates noncitizens’ entitlement to equal protection while 
present in the United States, but it also demonstrates that animus can doom the 
application of a facially neutral law when racial animus is the sole motive for 
the challenged application.317  
Equal protection applies to immigrants within the United States, but equal 
protection challenges to immigration laws are rarely successful. The federal 
government’s alienage classifications receive rational basis scrutiny, which 
means the government wins if it has a merely rational basis for the 
classification.318 Similarly, the federal government has latitude to make 
distinctions among noncitizens based on national origin, especially in 
connection with admission and removal.319 For example, when the Supreme 
Court first articulated the plenary power doctrine in Chae Chan Ping, it declined 
to review the explicitly racist Chinese Exclusion Act.320 As noted earlier, 
however, the Equal Protection Clause did not yet apply to the federal 
government, and thus, there was no basis for subjecting any federal law to such 
scrutiny, let alone an immigration law.321 
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Outside of immigration law, a line of cases provides for a robust “rational 
basis” review where a law embodies animus toward an unpopular group.322 In 
cases like U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,323 City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center,324 Romer v. Evans,325 and United States v. Windsor,326 
the Supreme Court applied rational basis review to invalidate laws or decisions 
that exhibited “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”327 
These cases, too, involved laws passed or decisions taken due to purportedly 
legitimate considerations; but evidence of animus gave the court latitude to 
perform a more searching review to determine the real reason for the challenged 
law or decision.328 In these cases, the courts imposed an evidentiary burden on 
defendants to prove their motives rather than merely resting on hypothesized 
purposes.329  
Outside of these core “animus” cases, analysis of discriminatory intent330 in 
equal protection has spawned a variety of tests for invalidity. Initially, the Court 
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established a “but-for” test for racial discrimination cases. In Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court ruled 
that a plaintiff could prevail on an equal protection claim by proving that racial 
animus was a “but-for” cause of the challenged decision.331 In that case, 
plaintiffs petitioned to rezone a tract of land in the Village of Arlington Heights 
to build affordable housing, which black families primarily would inhabit.332 
After a series of public meetings, where at least some members of the public 
espoused concern about black families moving in, the Village Plan Commission 
(“Village”) denied the petition to rezone, and plaintiffs sued, arguing that the 
Village denied the petition to prevent black families from moving into the area 
in question.333 The district court denied relief, but the court of appeals reversed 
in part. On review, the Supreme Court determined that an improper motive alone 
would not invalidate a decision or law.334 Instead, in a case of mixed motives, 
the plaintiffs would have to show that the same decision would not have been 
made but-for the racially discriminatory purpose.335 Lacking direct evidence of 
Village officials’ racial animus, plaintiffs could not overcome the Village’s 
race-neutral reason for denying the rezoning petition, namely that the area had 
always been zoned for single family homes.336  
The Supreme Court has also suggested that an improper racially 
discriminatory purpose automatically taints a facially neutral law.337 In Hunter 
v. Underwood, the Supreme Court invalidated Article VIII, § 182 of the 
Alabama Constitution of 1901, which excluded persons convicted of crimes 
involving “moral turpitude” from voting in state elections.338 The record 
revealed that delegates to Alabama’s Constitutional Convention of 1901 
convened for the purpose of establishing “‘white supremacy” ‘within the limits 
                                                                                                                     
analyzing “animus.” See Araiza, supra note 305, at 130–31 (describing discriminatory intent 
as analogous to animus).  
 331 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 n.21 
(1977); Fallon, supra note 115, at 555–56 (describing “but-for” standard articulated in 
Arlington Heights). 
 332 Arlington Heights, 492 U.S. at 257. 
 333 Id. at 257–59. 
 334 Id. at 270–71 n.21. 
 335 Id. Professor Richard Fallon has argued that this “misunderstands the relevant 
constitutional question.” Fallon, supra note 115, at 579. Rather than inquiring whether the 
same law would have been passed regardless of forbidden motive, the question is “whether 
a court should defer to the legislature’s judgment that a challenged statute comports with 
constitutional norms.” Id. His conclusion that a breach of deliberative obligations should end 
deference appears to support the lower courts’ suspension of plenary power deference upon 
a showing of animus, but it does not grapple with the special case of executive deference in 
immigration law.  
 336 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270. 
 337 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231–32 (1985); Verstein, supra note 36, at 
1144. 
 338 471 U.S. at 223. 
52 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:1 
imposed by the Federal Constitution.’”339 In litigation, however, the state 
argued that the purpose of the challenged provision “was to prevent the 
resurgence of Populism by disenfranchising practically all of the blacks and a 
large number of [poor] whites.”340 The Court relied heavily on the Court of 
Appeals’ determination that “there could be no finding that there was a 
competing permissible intent for the enactment of § 182.”341 As Professor 
Andrew Verstein has explained, rather than remanding to the trial court to 
determine the relative strengths of the two stated purposes, i.e., whether the 
desire to reduce the black voting population was truly a “but-for” motive for the 
provision, the Supreme Court concluded that the permissible purpose of 
disenfranchising poor whites “would not render nugatory” the improper purpose 
of discriminating against blacks.342 Thus, the Supreme Court purported to apply 
a “but-for” test but actually appeared to find the racist taint of anti-black 
discrimination insurmountable.343  
When the government invokes national security, however, the Court has 
taken a different approach. Korematsu v. United States offers insight into the 
dilemma of judges evaluating racially discriminatory laws peddled on national 
security grounds. In that case, the petitioner, Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu, 
sought to vacate his conviction for violating a civilian exclusion order that 
applied during World War II only to individuals of Japanese ancestry, including 
American citizens such as petitioner himself.344 The majority noted that facially 
discriminatory laws, such as the executive orders at issue, were subject to “the 
most rigid scrutiny,” in keeping with equal protection jurisprudence.345 
Nonetheless, the majority upheld petitioner’s conviction and the underlying 
orders on account of “the real military dangers which were presented.”346 In 
their view, national security concerns—even if formulated vaguely as race-
based suspicion of disloyalty—justified a facially discriminatory internment 
law.  
In dissent, Justice Murphy described military discretion as broad, but not 
unlimited, and noted that laws based on pleas of military necessity can only be 
justified on the grounds of “a public danger that is so ‘immediate, imminent, 
and impending’ as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of 
ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger.”347 In the instant case, 
                                                                                                                     
 339 Id. at 229 (quoting 1 Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the 
State of Alabama, May 21st, 1901 to Sept. 3rd, 1901, at 8 (1940)). 
 340 Id. at 230 (quoting Cross-Examination of Dr. J. Mills Thornton, 4 Record 73–74, 80–
81). 
 341 Id. at 225. 
 342 See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1144; Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232. 
 343 See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1144. 
 344 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), overruled by Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
 345 Id. 
 346 Id. at 223. 
 347 Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Murphy decried the government’s reliance on “questionable racial and 
sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military 
judgment,” such as claims that those individuals of Japanese ancestry performed 
“emperor-worship ceremonies” and the existence of Japanese language schools 
suggested “group disloyalty.”348 Further, the government’s failure to provide 
individualized investigations and hearings on loyalty—procedures used for 
people of German or Italian descent—underscored the impermissible racial 
discrimination motivating the exclusion orders.349 In his famous dissent, Justice 
Jackson acknowledged the judiciary’s limited competence to review military 
decisions, which are often based on secret evidence and unproven 
assumptions.350 He noted that courts often have access only to reports of 
questionable credibility and “unsworn, self-serving” statements by military 
officials.351 Thus, courts must necessarily accept “the mere declaration of the 
authority that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military 
viewpoint.”352 By reviewing and approving of the contested orders, however, 
the Court risks transforming a “passing incident” into “the doctrine of the 
Constitution.”353 Although the majority appeared to regard Korematsu as a 
mixed motives case, where both racial prejudice and national security played a 
role, the dissent saw it as a “sole motive” case, one in which individuals of 
Japanese ancestry were interned “solely” because of their race.354 In its travel 
ban decision, the Supreme Court announced that Korematsu “was overruled” 
but failed to admit that the government had justified the orders at issue there, 
too, on national security grounds.355  
B. Religious Discrimination 
The First Amendment’s religion clauses also support invalidation of laws 
motivated by animus toward an unpopular religious group, and the Supreme 
Court in this setting appears to use the “any” motive standard rather than the 
“but-for” motive standard.356 In relevant part, the First Amendment states: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
                                                                                                                     
 348 Id. at 236–37.  
 349 Id. at 241. 
 350 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 351 Id.  
 352 Id.  
 353 Id. at 246. 
 354 Id. at 226 (Roberts, J. dissenting). 
 355 See Joseph Fishkin, Why Was Korematsu Wrong?, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2018), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/06/why-was-korematsu-wrong.html 
[https://perma.cc/92VU-K3VK]; see also Anil Kalhan, Trump v. Hawaii and Chief Justice 
Roberts’s “Korematsu Overruled” Parlor Trick, ACS BLOG (June 29, 2018), 
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/trump-v-hawaii-and-chief-justice-roberts’s-”korematsu-
overruled”-parlor-trick [https://perma.cc/39V4-PT24]. 
 356 See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 
(1993).  
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”357 In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, the Supreme Court considered the validity of a city ordinance 
that banned the ritual slaughter of animals.358 Members of a church practicing 
the Santeria faith, for which animal sacrifice is a central practice, challenged the 
ordinance as a violation of the First Amendment.359 The Court found the 
ordinances facially neutral, references to “ritual” notwithstanding, but it 
determined that the purpose and effect of the law was to suppress “the central 
element of the Santeria worship service.”360 Drawing on equal protection 
jurisprudence, the Court determined that the city had adopted the challenged 
ordinances “because of” rather than “in spite of” of the impact on Santeria 
religious practice.361 In particular, the Court found the record to reveal abundant 
evidence of lawmakers’ hostility to Santeria.362 In contrast, compliance with the 
Free Exercise Clause requires lawmakers to ensure that their “sole reasons for 
imposing the burdens of law and regulation are secular.”363 As a result, the Court 
invalidated the ordinance and appeared to use the rigorous “any” motive 
standard to police laws burdening religious practice.364  
Analysis of Establishment Clause claims similarly turns on a purpose 
inquiry.365 In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Supreme Court 
affirmed a preliminary injunction against a Ten Commandments display in 
various county courthouses in Kentucky.366 The Court reaffirmed the centrality 
of the purpose inquiry and determined that secular purposes articulated as 
litigation positions could not negate an apparent predominantly religious 
purpose.367 Holding that the Establishment Clause demands “governmental 
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and 
nonreligion,”368 the Court ruled that support was “ample” for the district court’s 
finding that the Ten Commandments display had a predominantly religious 
purpose, post-hoc secular explanations notwithstanding.369 Ultimately, the 
religious discrimination jurisprudence stands out for the central role of objective 
purpose in determining the validity of official acts. Church of Lukumi also 
suggests that lawmakers’ animus toward an unpopular religion may contribute 
                                                                                                                     
 357 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 358 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 524, 526. 
 359 Id. at 523–25.  
 360 Id. at 534. 
 361 Id. at 540–41. 
 362 Id. at 541. 
 363 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 547. 
 364 Id. at 546. 
 365 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 615 (1971). 
 366 545 U.S. at 881. 
 367 Id. at 871. 
 368 Id. at 860. 
 369 Id. at 881. 
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to a court’s decision to invalidate a facially neutral law.370 Although the Court’s 
language varies, and setting aside potentially important distinctions between 
“purpose” and “motive,”371 it appears that the Court uses a motive standard 
intolerant of any quantum of animus.372 However, this jurisprudence does not 
offer guidance regarding the effect of plenary power deference on the analysis 
of animus.373  
C. Animus and Prosecutorial Discretion: Vindictive Prosecution 
Mainstream constitutional law offers some guidance on the impact of 
animus on a facially neutral law, but it does not address the impact of a deference 
doctrine like immigration’s plenary power. Analogies are hard to find because 
so rarely are officials granted as much discretion as the President in exercising 
his statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). A useful analogy, however, 
appears in the context of criminal prosecution. Similar to the President 
identifying classes of noncitizens for exclusion, prosecutors have broad latitude 
to bring charges.374 Courts seldom interfere in those decisions, instead giving 
deference to executive judgments in both settings.375 Nonetheless, the presence 
of animus triggers a role for the courts in both settings. Specifically, in criminal 
law, the doctrine known as “vindictive prosecution”376 provides a cause of 
                                                                                                                     
 370 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 
(1993); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes 
Inspired by the Problem of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 30 
(1993) (arguing that “[w]hat made the city’s action [in Babalu Aye] violate the First 
Amendment was that it in fact targeted, and punished, only those animal sacrifices which 
were religious in character,” not merely that the city “set out” to do so). This confirms 
doctrine holding that, discriminatory purpose alone, without discriminatory effects, is not 
actionable in such a case.  
 371 See Fallon, supra note 115, at 531. 
 372 The Court reaffirmed this intolerance for government officials’ disparagement of an 
individual’s religious beliefs s in its recent decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018) (cataloguing commission’s “hostility” toward 
baker Jack Phillips’ “sincere religious beliefs”). 
 373 Scholars and jurists have observed that the Establishment Clause is typically applied 
in cases dealing directly with religious beliefs or practices, or with conduct supporting 
religious institutions, and they have questioned the propriety of extending the Establishment 
Clause to the different context of the travel ban. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 
(2018) (discussing how the application of the Establishment Clause here is different from 
the “conventional” Establishment Clause case). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court considered 
the Establishment Clause but selected a motive standard much more tolerant of animus. I 
thank Peter Margulies for raising this point.  
 374 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).  
 375 See, e.g., id. 
 376 See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373, 377 (1982) (describing Court’s 
presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when “action detrimental to the defendant has 
been taken after the exercise of a legal right”). For an example of alleged vindictive 
prosecution with an immigration nexus, see Paul Elias, Garcia Zarate Gets Time Served for 
Gun Charge in Kate Steinle Shooting Death Case, NBC BAY AREA (Jan. 5, 2018), 
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action for individuals prosecuted out of animus. Although the analogy of 
vindictive prosecution to plenary power in exclusion is weaker than the analogy 
to the President’s discretion in the realm of removal,377 the analogy remains 
useful because vindictive prosecution includes both a highly discretionary 
decision (whether to bring charges), one typically entitled to deference, and 
allegations of animus.378  
When probable cause supports charges against a defendant, a prosecutor 
enjoys broad discretion to bring charges.379 This is the essence of prosecutorial 
discretion. Prosecutors consider factors such as “resource limitations, law 
enforcement priorities, needs or wishes of the victim, and the perceived public 
interest” when deciding whether to bring charges.380 Prosecutorial discretion 
intends to promote efficiency and other values.381 Accordingly, a defendant 
typically has no right to challenge an indictment otherwise based on probable 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Jose-Ines-Garcia-Zarate-Sentencing-Kate-Steinle-
2015-Fatal-Shooting-San-Francisco-Pier-468127093.html [https://perma.cc/G3LM-F9XQ]. 
Kate Steinle, a San Francisco woman, was killed when Jose Ines Garcia Zarate fired a gun 
he found by the pier, and the bullet ricocheted and struck her. President Trump focused on 
Zarate’s status as a five-time-deported undocumented immigrant to bolster support for a wall 
between Mexico and the U.S. After a jury acquitted Zarate of murder in state court, the U.S. 
Attorney sought to bring gun charges on Zarate involving the same offense. Zarate’s attorney 
decried the prosecution as a violation of double jeopardy and a politically-motivated 
“vindictive prosecution.” Id. 
 377 See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 14, at 464. I thank Fatma Marouf for raising this 
point.  
 378 Defendants usually have greater success in bringing vindictive prosecution claims 
post-trial, challenging, for example, a prosecutor’s decision to try a defendant on new 
charges that were available during the defendant’s first unsuccessful trial. See United States 
v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 319 (4th Cir. 2001). Structural racism permeates all levels of the 
criminal justice system, and one might wonder whether a cause of action originating in 
criminal law can offer a meaningful check on animus. See Radley Balko, There’s 
Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal-justice System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof,  
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/ 
09/18/theres-overwhelming-evidence-that-the-criminal-justice-system-is-racist-heres-the- 
proof/?utm_term=.aa6aac71325d [https://perma.cc/PT9M-UKMR]. The search for a 
compelling analogy, however, is no guarantee of finding an appropriate remedy for the 
problem of racial and religious animus. Rather, the hope is to better understand what courts 
already do in similar cases. If courts do not remedy discrimination where decisionmakers are 
owed deference in, say, criminal law, that suggests that the courts are unlikely to provide 
relief in an exclusion setting. 
 379 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). 
 380 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1244 
(2011).  
 381 Id. 
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cause.382 Prosecutors, like the Executive, enjoy a “presumption of 
regularity.”383 
Prosecutorial discretion has limits, however, and “[t]he Constitution 
prohibits the government from undertaking a prosecution based solely on a 
vindictive motive.”384 Defendants can seek dismissal of charges against them 
upon proffering “clear evidence” of prosecutorial animus to overcome the 
presumption of regularity.385 Criminal defendants asserting vindictive 
prosecution claims at the pretrial stage must come forward with objective 
evidence of prosecutorial animus rather than inferences based on speculation.386 
They typically must possess “smoking gun”387 evidence of a prosecutor’s 
animus, such as the prosecutor’s public or private statements or documents 
evincing the government’s improper motive.388 Once the plaintiff does so, the 
burden shifts to the government to demonstrate a legitimate purpose for the 
prosecution, specifically that the prosecutor’s animus toward the defendant was 
not a “but-for” cause of the prosecution.389  
The federal appeals courts that have considered vindictive prosecution 
claims tend to equate “but-for” cause with “sole motive.”390 In United States v. 
Jarrett, the Seventh Circuit explained that a criminal defendant can succeed on 
                                                                                                                     
 382 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464–65 (“In the ordinary case, ‘so long as the prosecutor 
has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the 
decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, 
generally rests entirely in his discretion.’” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
364 (1978))). 
 383 Id. 
 384 United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. 
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.12 (1982) (noting that lack of a presumption of vindictiveness 
does not “foreclose the possibility that a defendant might prove through objective evidence 
an improper prosecutorial motive,” and specifically, that prosecutor’s conduct was “solely 
to ‘penalize’ the defendant and could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion”). 
 385 Jarrett, 447 F.3d at 524–25 (interpreting “prosecutorial animus” to mean “a personal 
stake in the outcome of the case or an attempt to seek self-vindication”).  
 386 Id. at 525. 
 387 Id. at 527. 
 388 Id. (finding it significant that defendant seeking dismissal of charges failed to 
“produced any public or private statement by a prosecutor manifesting animus toward him; 
any document that might establish bad motives on the part of the government; or any similar 
‘smoking gun’”).  
 389 Id. at 525 (noting that once defendant proffers objective evidence of the prosecutor’s 
vindictive motive, “[a] court must be persuaded that the defendant would not have been 
prosecuted but for the government’s animus or desire to penalize him”).  
 390 See id. at 524; United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 2001); Verstein, 
supra note 36, at 1161 & tbl.1. Constitutional law scholars have also tended to equate the 
two standards. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of 
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 119 (1971) (discussing proof 
that illicit motive was “sole” or “dominant” motive as tantamount to proving that, “but for 
the decisionmaker’s desire to promote an illicit objective, the decision would not have been 
made”).  
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a vindictive prosecution claim only upon proving that, but for the animus, the 
criminal defendant would not have been prosecuted.391 However, the court 
characterized the defendant’s claim as asserting that the prosecutor’s “sole 
purpose” in charging him was to remove him as counsel for another party.392 
Similarly, in United States v. Wilson, the Fourth Circuit explained that 
establishing prosecutorial vindictiveness requires showing that “(1) the 
prosecutor acted with genuine animus toward the defendant and (2) the 
defendant would not have been prosecuted but for that animus.”393 In the same 
citation, however, the court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Goodwin for 
the proposition that “‘charges must be brought ‘solely to penalize’ the defendant 
and could not be justified as a proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion.’”394 
Thus, judges speak imprecisely about whether a criminal defendant must prove 
animus is the sole motive for the prosecution or a but-for motive.395 As it turns 
out, the distinction matters, for the sole motive standard operates to “give 
the . . . case to the defendant.”396 If animus matters at all to the resolution of 
these claims, the sole motive standard must be rejected, and such a rejection is 
consistent with the vindictive prosecution cases described above.  
Ultimately, criminal defendants have a right under equal protection and due 
process not to be prosecuted based on their protected characteristics or merely 
due to prosecutorial animus, even if the defendant is properly charged 
otherwise.397 Despite prosecutors’ substantial discretion, “smoking gun” 
                                                                                                                     
 391 447 F.3d at 528.  
 392 Id. at 530. 
 393 262 F.3d at 314. In Wilson, the court discussed the availability of a presumption of 
vindictiveness absent direct evidence. It suggested that such a presumption would be 
warranted where a prosecutor initially decided not to try the defendant “on an additional 
available charge” but later did so “after the defendant’s successful appeal.” Id. at 319. In 
such a case, courts could draw an inference that “the only material fact different the second 
time around—the defendant’s successful appeal of his original conviction,” prompted the 
second prosecution. Id. On this view, a defendant can receive a presumption of 
vindictiveness where the only possible motive is vindictiveness. Id. 
 394 Id. at 314 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.12 (1982).  
 395 See Jarrett, 447 F.3d at 524; see also Verstein, supra note 36, at 1161; cf. Hartman 
v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262–63 (2006) (rejecting defendant’s Bivens claim against a 
prosecutor based on a postal inspector’s animus toward defendant, which subsequently 
caused the prosecutor to bring charges, where probable cause supported the charges 
regardless).  
 396 See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1140. 
 397 Selective prosecution claims are closely related claims arising out of the requirement 
of equal protection. Prevailing on a selective prosecution claim requires proof of 
discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
456, 464–66 (1996). The Supreme Court has suggested that plaintiffs asserting these claims 
typically possess evidence of discriminatory impact but lack evidence of the prosecutor’s 
discriminatory intent in prosecuting them. Accordingly, these plaintiffs must produce 
evidence of discriminatory effect to obtain discovery to prove the prosecutor’s 
discriminatory intent. Id. at 464. 
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animus triggers a process for sorting through the prosecutor’s motives, 
potentially involving a burden-shifting framework.398  
D. Trump v. Hawaii in the Supreme Court 
This discussion regarding the correct analytic approach must contend with 
the Supreme Court’s ultimate resolution of the travel ban litigation. As noted 
above, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming the district 
court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, finding plaintiffs unlikely to prevail 
on their statutory or constitutional claims.399 As to the constitutional claim, the 
Court determined that plaintiffs had standing, and their Establishment Clause 
claim was justiciable because plaintiffs faced a concrete hardship of being 
separated from family members due to the travel ban.400 The Court then 
considered the merits, concluding that the case before it differed substantially 
from “the conventional Establishment Clause case”401 because of the political 
branches’ broad latitude in establishing the criteria for admission of 
noncitizens.402 The Court determined that Mandel applied, but that the 
government had accepted a more searching analysis. It then decided that it could 
consider the President’s statements of anti-Muslim animus, but only to the 
extent consistent with “rational basis review,”403 which the Court took to require 
no more than a plausible relationship between the exclusion order and the 
government’s stated national security objective.404 Ultimately, the Court 
acknowledged its authority to consider the President’s statements of animus, but 
then did nothing with them. The statements had no effect on the analysis, let 
alone the outcome, because the Court determined that animus was not the “sole” 
motive behind the exclusion order.405  
Responding to Justice Sotoymayor’s dissent, the Court denied Korematsu’s 
relevance to the analysis of the travel ban, even though the President himself 
likened the initial travel ban to President Roosevelt’s internment of Americans 
of Japanese descent during World War II.406 The Court specifically 
characterized Korematsu as “morally repugnant,” involving an internment order 
                                                                                                                     
 398 See Jarrett, 447 F.3d at 525, 527. 
 399 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
 400 Id. at 2416.  
 401 Id. at 2418. 
 402 Id. at 2418–19. 
 403 Id. at 2420.  
 404 Id. at 2421–23. 
 405 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018). 
 406 While on the campaign trail, Trump likened his proposed “Muslim ban” to President 
Roosevelt’s internment of people of Japanese ancestry during World War II. Adam Liptak, 
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“solely and explicitly on the basis of race.”407 As even the majority opinion in 
Korematsu makes clear,408 however, that case has never been considered one in 
which the government offered no justification apart from animus.409 Indeed, the 
government in that case argued that national security justified the civilian 
exclusion order, and the Korematsu majority invoked that very justification in 
upholding Fred Korematsu’s conviction.410 
Apart from its suspect discussion of Korematsu, the Court in Trump v. 
Hawaii unconvincingly distinguished the animus cases from the instant case.411 
The Court characterized the animus cases as ones involving a single motive—
animus—and no legitimate justifications. However, as scholars have noted, in 
each of those cases, government officials defended the challenged actions by 
invoking some legitimate public purpose.412 In Moreno, the claimed legitimate 
purpose was limiting the potential for abuse;413 in Cleburne, it was concerns 
about traffic and overcrowding;414 and in Romer, it was denying “homosexuals 
special rights.”415 Nonetheless, because of the discernible presence of animus in 
each case, either from legislative history,416 zoning commission hearings,417 or 
from the text of the enactment itself,418 the Court refused to accept defendants’ 
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administration of the food stamp program.”); see ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 32. 
 414 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 436–38, 438 & n.7 (1985) 
(describing the city’s concern that the Cleburne Living Center (CLC) group home would be 
overcrowded with thirteen residents rather than the state regulation’s maximum of six 
residents); see ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 38. 
 415 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626, 638 (1996) (discussing the Colorado amendment 
that prohibits “special treatment of homosexuals”); see ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 55. 
 416 See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535 (“The legislative history that does exist, however, 
indicates that that amendment was intended to prevent so called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie 
communes’ from participating in the food stamp program.”); see also ARAIZA, supra note 
305, at 31. 
 417 See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436–37, n.4, 465, n.17 (describing the City of 
Cleburne’s historical precedent of discriminating against intellectually disabled individuals 
through city ordinances); ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 38. 
 418 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 55–56. 
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post-hoc rationalizations.419 Instead, the presence of direct evidence of animus 
led the Court to apply a more searching rational basis review.420 Rather than 
requiring plaintiffs to prove that official action was undertaken solely based on 
animus, the animus cases contemplated mixed motives as well.421 The Court’s 
failure to acknowledge this will likely produce confusion in the lower courts, 
and the need for a proper analytic approach has only grown since the Court’s 
initial assessment of plaintiffs’ claims. 
V. A PATH FORWARD: A ROLE FOR THE COURTS 
Courts that have analyzed the effect of President Trump’s anti-Muslim 
statements on the validity of his travel bans have taken one of two views: full, 
continued deference, provided the President supplies even one legitimate reason 
for the challenged policy422 or, alternatively, no deference at all.423 The above 
discussion, however, reveals a third way that offers greater clarity and promise: 
a mixed motives analysis that parses the relative contributions of animus and 
potentially legitimate motives behind an exclusion law. Consider how such a 
framework might apply to the Trump travel bans on remand in the lower courts 
and the most likely objections to this application. 
A. Applying a Mixed Motives Framework to the Travel Bans 
This Article contends that the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard 
of review applicable to exclusion decisions under Kleindienst v. Mandel should 
also apply to exclusion laws such as the travel bans.424 Although some judges 
contend that the greatest possible deference must be shown to the political 
branches’ discretionary choice of criteria for admission and removal, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that courts retain the authority to review exclusion 
                                                                                                                     
 419 See ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 119; Steve Sanders, Making It Up: Lessons for Equal 
Protection Doctrine from the Use and Abuse of Hypothesized Purposes in the Marriage 
Equality Litigation, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 700 (2017) (noting the Court’s failure to credit 
post-hoc rationalizations in the animus cases).  
 420 See ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 119. 
 421 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 765, 798–99 (2013); Brief of 
Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents at 25, Trump v. Int’l 
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (No. 16–1436); Cristina M. Rodriguez, 
Trump v. Hawaii and the Future of Presidential Power over Immigration, 2017-18 ACS 
SUP. CT. REV. 161, 187–88 (2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/ 
ACS-Supreme-Court-Review-2018-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4WC-42YZ]. 
 422 See Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting 
from denial of reconsideration en banc).  
 423 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 592 (4th Cir. 2017), 
vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). As noted, however, the Supreme Court 
assumed the “sole” motive standard applied but did not decide the question.  
 424 See supra Part II; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018) (stating that 
Mandel applies to an exclusion order). 
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laws for at least some minimal factual basis.425 Moreover, the government’s 
failure to assert the power to explicitly discriminate based on race or religion, 
the strongest form of plenary power authority, strengthens the case for judicial 
review.426 At oral argument, the Solicitor General conceded that even a facially 
neutral exclusion order would be unconstitutional under Mandel if the President 
ordered the Cabinet to “keep out a particular race or a particular religion, no 
matter what.”427 Thus, only a milder version of plenary power is at issue: the 
power to enact a facially neutral exclusion law in part with a discriminatory 
purpose, i.e., with the partial objective of barring admission of an unpopular 
group defined by race or religion due to an irrational fear or hatred of that 
group.428 It is this combination—facial neutrality and some degree of lawmaker 
animus—that this Article addresses.  
Even though the Supreme Court agreed with many lower court judges that 
Mandel applies to the travel bans, judges disagree about the permissibility of 
considering “extrinsic evidence” of a law’s purpose, such as the President’s 
speeches and tweets, under Mandel.429 Several judges on the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits have argued that Mandel does not permit consideration of extrinsic 
evidence because “facially legitimate” means courts may look only to the face 
of the exclusion law and “bona fide” does not permit “looking behind” the 
Executive’s stated reasons.430 This interpretation is baffling, as it eliminates the 
requirement that the reason be “bona fide.” If a requirement that a reason be 
“bona fide” does not authorize a court to review public statements constituting 
                                                                                                                     
 425 Cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590 (1952) (noting that the court could 
not “declare that congressional alarm about a coalition of Communist power . . . is either a 
fantasy or a pretense,” and that “no responsible American would say that there . . . are now 
no possible grounds on which Congress might believe that Communists in our midst are 
inimical to our security”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972). 
 426 Margo Schlanger, Symposium: Could This Be the End of Plenary Power?, 
SCOTUSblog (July 14, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-end-
plenary-power/ [https://perma.cc/N5NN-L4SQ] (referring to this argument as the “dog that 
is not barking in the night”); see also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 
233, 322 (4th Cir. 2018) (Wynn, J., concurring) (noting that neither the government nor the 
dissenting Justices defended the President’s power to invidiously discriminate based on a 
protected classification, such as race, sex, or religion).  
 427 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) 
(No. 17-965). 
 428 Cf. Neuman, supra note 74 (arguing that EO-1 was not facially neutral because it 
refers to “honor killings” and preference for Christian refugees). Thus, an even milder form 
of plenary power remains—the power to issue facially neutral order, but with animus as one 
of at least two motives.  
 429 Compare Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591–92, 594 
(finding it permissible to consider the President’s extrinsic statements) vacated as moot, 138 
S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.), with id. at 652 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (finding it impermissible 
to consider the President’s extrinsic statements). 
 430 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 648 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); 
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from the 
denial of reconsideration en banc). 
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direct evidence of improper motive, how else would a plaintiff ever be able to 
show a “facially legitimate” reason was not bona fide?431 If courts lack even this 
power, then the standard is better understood as “facially legitimate,” full stop.  
Judges reluctant to “look behind” stated reasons for Executive policy 
correctly observe that the search for a “bona fide” reason would not authorize 
courts to grant plaintiffs’ discovery to establish an executive’s improper 
purpose.432 However, when the Executive himself places his allegedly improper 
motive into public discourse,433 the plaintiffs are not then seeking the court’s 
assistance in prying into the Executive’s private deliberations.434 In such 
circumstances, Mandel’s concern for taking the Executive’s stated reasons at 
face value does not apply.435 Thus, courts can and should consider the 
President’s speeches and tweets in cases such as the travel ban litigation.436  
Finally, the typical wariness about invalidating laws, especially ones 
entitled to deference, based solely on improper motive springs from a fear or 
suspicion that the court would be participating in a “charade.”437 On this view, 
invalidating an executive order would be futile if the President could promulgate 
                                                                                                                     
 431 Notably, the Solicitor General conceded in the argument before the Supreme Court 
that a President’s extrinsic statements to Cabinet officials after taking the oath of office could 
undermine the facial legitimacy of his stated reason for an entry ban under Mandel. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965). 
 432 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 648 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). But 
cf. Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2018) 
(cataloguing “evidentiary instruments available for identifying impermissible motives,” 
including civil discovery).  
 433 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 594. 
 434 Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) (denying plaintiffs’ 
discovery as to discriminatory intent absent a showing of discriminatory impact); Kleindienst 
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding that the court will not “look behind” 
Executive’s stated reason when it is both “facially legitimate and bona fide”). For a defense 
of judges considering extrinsic evidence of purpose in Korematsu and the travel ban cases, 
see Ian Samuel & Leah Litman, No Peeking? Korematsu and Judicial Credulity, TAKE CARE 
(Mar. 22, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/no-peeking-korematsu-and-judicial- 
credulity [https://perma.cc/K32P-92J3]. 
 435 See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. Moreover, recent criticisms of efforts to ascribe a 
unitary intent or purpose to a multi-member body, like Congress, have less force when 
considering the intent or purpose of a single individual: the President. Katherine Shaw, 
Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. REV. 71, 139 (2017). 
 436 Shaw, supra note 435, at 139. But cf. Jacob T. Levy, The Weight of the Words, 
NISKANEN CTR. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/the-weight-of-the-words/ 
[https://perma.cc/2GTW-C793] (arguing that President Trump’s political speech is a form 
of political action, one that has the power to “undermine the existence of shared belief in 
truth and facts,” and should not be ignored); see also Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and 
the President, 104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing that presidential intent is 
properly considered for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of an executive order, as 
illustrated by the travel ban litigation).  
 437 John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 
YALE L.J. 1205, 1214 (1970). 
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the same executive order, but this time, stay off Twitter.438 The wrinkle in the 
instant case, however, is that the President is trading on animus. Far from 
inadvertently disclosing his private thoughts, he purposely shares his prejudices 
to appeal to his base, to reassure them of his racism, especially at moments when 
he might be perceived as showing generosity toward sympathetic noncitizens, 
such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) recipients, or making 
deals with political adversaries.439 For this reason, the danger of enmeshing the 
courts in a “charade” is especially low.440 Thus, courts should consider the 
President’s speech as direct evidence of animus. 
For judges who accept this proposition, however, a further question 
remains: what motive standard should apply? In the lower courts, judges 
vacillated between the “sole motive” and “any motive” standard,441 and in the 
Supreme Court, the majority selected “sole motive,” and two of the dissenters 
applied the “primary motive” standard.442 In so doing, all of these judges 
overlooked the remaining option: “but-for” motive.443 Cases like Church of 
Lukumi and McCreary County suggest that either the “any motive” or “primary 
motive” standards typically apply to religious discrimination cases. Under 
Church of Lukumi, the presence of any improper motive invalidates a law 
because it means that the law was not passed with purely innocent motives.444 
Similarly, under McCreary, a law fails Establishment Clause scrutiny if it does 
not have a “predominantly” secular purpose.445 This does not mean a 
government enactment cannot have a religious purpose, but, simply, that it must 
also have a stronger, independently sufficient secular purpose to be valid.446  
                                                                                                                     
 438 See id. 
 439 See Taegan Goddard, Trump Bragged to Friends About ‘Shithole’ Remark, POL. 
WIRE (Jan. 14, 2018), https://politicalwire.com/2018/01/14/trump-bragged-friends-shithole-
remark/ [https://perma.cc/R3CG-V82V]. 
 440 See Ely, supra note 437, at 1214. But see Brest, supra note 390, at 139 (arguing for 
judicial review of motivation even in discretionary choices). 
 441 See supra Part II. 
 442 Compare Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420–21 (2018) (analyzing whether the 
exclusion order was “‘inexplicable by anything but animus’”), with id. at 2438 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (using the “primary purpose” test under Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
 443 See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1161 (listing four widespread motive standards). But 
see Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed Motives Jurisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (arguing that all other motive standards are superior to the “but-for” 
standard). 
 444 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).  
 445 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 446 See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1134 (discussing “primary motive” as a more plaintiff-
friendly standard, requiring only that the impermissible motive exceed the permissible one, 
even if both are independently sufficient to motivate the contested enactment). 
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These standards, perhaps reflecting the Framers’ special concern for 
religious freedom,447 demand a great deal from the government. Plenary power 
deference in immigration law does not.448 As a result, courts must consider 
whether a more deferential motive standard should apply to religious 
discrimination challenges to immigration law. Based on a careful review of 
equal protection jurisprudence and the analogy to prosecutorial discretion, this 
Article contends that the “but-for” motive standard provides a compelling, 
sensible alternative.449 
The analogy between prosecutorial discretion and Executive discretion in 
immigration law helps explain the appeal of this approach. Just like a prosecutor 
deciding whether to bring charges against a potential defendant or set policy for 
their department, the President has broad discretion to suspend the entry of 
certain noncitizens and to develop a policy articulating the criteria for 
exclusion.450 Just as courts are reluctant to intrude on a prosecutor’s discretion 
in criminal law, courts hesitate to intrude on the President’s policy choices 
regarding admission and removal of noncitizens.451 However, direct evidence 
of animus alters the court’s role in the criminal law and should have the same 
effect in the immigration setting. In criminal law, courts can intervene in a 
prosecutor’s decision to bring charges against a defendant amid direct evidence 
of prosecutorial animus.452 Although courts do not currently recognize selective 
immigration enforcement claims, under Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee453 the Supreme Court has reserved the possibility of 
recognizing a claim in “a rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination 
is so outrageous” to overcome the Court’s general skepticism toward such 
claims.454 This appears to preserve space for a kind of “vindictive” immigration 
enforcement claim. Ultimately, even an opinion evincing minimal concerns for 
                                                                                                                     
 447 See McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 876 (discussing Framers’ concerns for preserving 
religious conscience as well as “guard[ing] against the civic divisiveness that follows when 
the government weighs in on one side of religious debate”).  
 448 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (requiring only a “facially 
legitimate and bona fide” reason for an exclusion decision).  
 449 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 492 U.S. 252, 270–71 
n.21 (1977); Kagan, supra note 24, at 89. 
 450 The prosecutor’s discretion follows from the Executive’s delegation to prosecutors 
to enforce the Nation’s laws, United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996), and the 
President’s discretion itself follows from Congress’s delegation under Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018). Again, the more apt analogy would be 
to the President’s removal authority, but the critical features of vindictive prosecution—
discretion and animus—remain useful.  
 451 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464; Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (1979). 
 452 United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 524–25 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 453 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999). 
 454 See id. 
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the rights of noncitizens in removal proceedings preserves the possibility of 
judicial review of conscience-shocking animus.455  
This analogy is imperfect for several reasons. First, prosecutors, unlike the 
President, are bound by ethical rules of conduct.456 Second, prosecutors bring 
charges against discrete defendants, while the President creates broad policy. 
When it comes to immigration law and foreign affairs, the courts do not demand 
precision in policymaking either. Ultimately, however, this analogy underscores 
that executive action to advance an end other than the public welfare, under the 
guise of executive discretion, warrants greater scrutiny.457  
Under the proposed mixed motives framework, inspired by courts’ 
treatment of vindictive prosecution claims, plaintiffs challenging an exclusion 
EO must come forward, as they have in the travel ban litigation, with direct 
evidence of the President’s animus.458 Once plaintiffs proffer this evidence, the 
government should produce evidence indicating that animus was not a “but-for” 
motive for the contested law.459 The government must produce evidence 
showing that a legitimate purpose, such as national security, constitutes an 
independently sufficient reason for the law460—not merely “an independent” 
reason.461 The plaintiff must ultimately prove that animus was essential.462 
                                                                                                                     
 455 Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding police conduct 
“shock[ed] the conscience” where the police broke into a criminal defendant’s home, 
attempted to dislodge capsules from defendant’s mouth, and then handcuffed him and 
transported him to the hospital, where defendant’s stomach was pumped against his will and 
produced two morphine capsules).  
 456 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT rr. 3.3, 3.6, 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) 
(requiring, respectively, candor to the tribunal, limiting trial publicity, and requiring timely 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence, among other obligations).  
 457 See ARAIZA, supra note 305, at 109–10.  
 458 See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591–92, 594 (4th Cir. 
2017), vacating as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (mem.). 
 459 See United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2006); Verstein, supra note 
36, at 1137–38. 
 460 See Verstein, supra note 36, at 1137–38. 
 461 Cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) (“But because there is persuasive 
evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, 
quite apart from any religious hostility, we must accept that independent justification.”); 
Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J., dissenting from the 
denial of reconsideration en banc). 
 462 This motive standard finds support in statements by attorneys litigating the case as 
well as scholarly commentary. For example, at oral argument, counsel for the plaintiffs 
conceded that the President’s disavowal of his earlier anti-Muslim statements would render 
the exclusion order constitutional. On that reasoning, the order becomes valid because 
animus is no longer a necessary motive behind it. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 62–
63, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965). In addition, Professor Michael C. Dorf 
has argued that any “reasonable observer” would agree that the travel bans would not have 
been promulgated “but for” the President’s anti-Muslim animus. Michael Dorf, SCOTUS 
Travel Ban Argument Post-Mortem and the Surprising Relevance of Korematsu, DORF ON 
LAW (Apr. 25, 2018), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/04/scotus-travel-ban-argument-post-
mortem.html [https://perma.cc/2B43-YMKL]; see also Marty Lederman, Contrary to 
2019] PLENARY POWER AND ANIMUS IN IMMIGRATION LAW  67 
As discussed above, the proposed framework is workable. But it also 
expresses a compelling view of what plenary power means: a deference doctrine 
that gives a certain freedom to the political branches to establish the criteria for 
admission, but not a license to implement animus. It is the discretion to choose 
among legitimate ends. When the President publicly chooses a mix of legitimate 
and illegitimate ends, acting with mixed motives, he should be permitted to 
enact policy for which the legitimate motives are sufficient; and he should be 
prohibited from enacting policy for which the illegitimate motive is necessary. 
Why? Official acts necessarily motivated by illegitimate motives are not 
exercises of discretion; they are violations of it. And if an illegitimate motive is 
ultimately unnecessary to the policy and a legitimate justification is sufficient 
standing alone, that illegitimate motive cannot be said to have made a 
difference. The proposed framework preserves the President’s discretion to 
advance legitimate ends.463 
This approach also seeks to create a process for developing an evidentiary 
record from which the Court can evaluate the role of animus. The first step is 
for plaintiffs to file a complaint pleading animus with “particularity.”464 
Plaintiffs would likely seek a preliminary injunction. Defendants would then 
come forward with evidence of a sufficient legitimate purpose. To substantiate 
that purpose, defendants might attach affidavits or declarations from national 
security specialists, Cabinet officials, and even historians who can comment on 
the consistency of the contested executive orders with prior orders in previous 
Administrations. Ultimately, plaintiffs will have to undermine the independent 
sufficiency of the government’s stated reason. For example, in the travel ban 
litigation, plaintiffs could demonstrate the “sham” nature of the waiver 
process.465 Challenges to exclusion orders are unlikely to be amenable to 
resolution at the preliminary injunction phase. Through the creation of an 
evidentiary record, however, the court acquires the tools needed to evaluate 
whether the government’s objectives are in fact “bona fide,” to discern if the 
stated justification is sufficient. Courts must consider the full factual record, 
                                                                                                                     
Popular Belief, the Court Did Not Hold that the Travel Ban Is Lawful–Anything but, JUST 
SECURITY (July 2, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58807/contrary-popular-belief-court-
hold-travel-ban-lawful-anything-but-which-ruling-justice-kennedys-deference-presidents-
enforcement-ban-indefensible/ [https://perma.cc/7QJ4-3356] (noting that “the Travel Ban 
would not exist but for its foreseeable effect in excluding Muslims from entry”). Although 
these commentators were not arguing for the “but-for” motive standard vis-à-vis the other 
three main options, it is telling that it is a standard invoked so widely in the debate (except 
in the courts). 
 463 But see Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination, 104 VA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that an illegitimate motive alone is and should be 
sufficient to render official action unconstitutional). 
 464 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015). 
 465 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2445 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(describing plaintiffs’ contention that the waiver process was “nothing more than a sham”). 
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including whether the existence of some facts undermine the likelihood of other 
facts being true.466  
The framework proposed herein is designed for the exceptional present 
times, but it aims to address an old question in immigration law that will likely 
arise periodically. Critics note that the President has accused Mexico of sending 
criminals into the United States,467 called for a “shutdown” of Muslim 
immigration,468 expressed sympathy for Nazis,469 and disparaged, in vulgar 
language, black and brown countries from which many migrants hail.470 His 
“smoking gun”471 animus should not escape judicial notice when such 
comments communicate the legal purpose for his actions.472 Taking notice, 
however, does not require a radical reworking of immigration law. Instead, 
when the President inserts racial or religious animus into public discourse of his 
own accord, Mandel itself permits courts to demand that the government pay an 
                                                                                                                     
 466 For a discussion of a “mixed motives” presumption in the national security and 
criminal law setting, see Lee Ross Crain, Note, The Legality of Deliberate Miranda 
Violations: How Two-Step National Security Interrogations Undermine Miranda and 
Destabilize Fifth Amendment Protections, 112 MICH. L. REV. 453, 485–86 (2013). Crain 
argues that a “mixed motives” presumption would mean that courts would not regard 
evidence of a permissible motive, such as national security, as undermining the simultaneous 
existence of an impermissible motive when law enforcement engage in two-step 
interrogations, the first without the Miranda warning, and then the second with it. Id.  
 467 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican 
Immigrants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immig 
rants-and-crime/?utm_term=.25cf9373bb83 [https://perma.cc/8VD3-9YAC].  
 468 Greg Sargent, Is This a ‘Muslim Ban’? Look at the History–and at Trump’s Own 
Words, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-
line/wp/2017/01/31/is-this-a-muslim-ban-look-at-the-history-and-at-trumps-own-
words/?utm_term=.95333035a102 [https://perma.cc/7VC3-97VS] (arguing that Trump’s 
language does not definitively prove the ban is a “Muslim” ban, but his remarks leave room 
to argue that the ban has an improper discriminatory intent and effect). 
 469 See Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on 
Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-
charlottesville.html [on file with Ohio State Law Journal].  
 470 Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers with Disparaging Words for 
Haiti and Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/us/ 
politics/trump-shithole-countries.html [https://perma.cc/T8TZ-U6ME]. Unsurprisingly, the  
President’s animus has led to equal protection challenges to many of his Administration’s 
immigration law decisions, specifically the rescission of DACA and Temporary Protected 
Status (TPS) for persons from Honduras and El Salvador. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of 
Calif. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2018).  
 471 United States v. Jarrett, 447 F.3d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 472 See Shaw, supra note 435, at 139. 
2019] PLENARY POWER AND ANIMUS IN IMMIGRATION LAW  69 
“animus tax” in the form of fully litigating its motives.473 In this manner, courts 
may maintain two cherished values: deference and dignity.474  
B. Objections 
One may anticipate several objections: (1) excluded noncitizens lack any 
constitutional rights, thus straining the analogies to equal protection and 
vindictive prosecution; (2) courts need to respect the political branches’ national 
security judgments regardless of animus; and (3) the proposed approach lacks 
teeth and essentially results in a “sole motive” analysis used by a majority of 
justices in Trump v. Hawaii.  
First, critics are likely to assert that equal protection jurisprudence and the 
vindictive prosecution analogy are strained or inapt because noncitizens outside 
of U.S. territory lack any rights of entry or equal protection.475 Challenges to a 
facially neutral exclusion law enacted out of racial or religious animus would 
invariably entail an assertion of equal protection rights, rights those excludable 
noncitizens outside of the U.S. ostensibly lack.476 Two points are relevant. First, 
in previous challenges to exclusion decisions, the weakness or complete lack of 
constitutional rights of noncitizens outside the U.S. has not precluded judicial 
review of exclusion decisions because citizens have brought suit to vindicate 
their constitutional rights.477 Second, the presence of “smoking gun” animus 
changes the nature of the analysis, for even when constitutional interests are 
“minimal,” the Supreme Court has recognized the potentially unique 
circumstances presented by “outrageous discrimination.”478 If severe animus 
can make removable noncitizens’ “minimal”479 constitutional interests more 
robust, then it could also enhance the importance of constitutional interests 
implicated, however indirectly, by exclusion laws as well. Essentially, when 
direct evidence of animus is at hand, the Court might consider equal protection 
more of a structural constraint on the government, much like the religion 
clauses,480 rather than an individual right that noncitizens can assert.  
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Next, critics might contend that national security interests require accepting 
policy based on stereotypes or ordinarily suspect classifications. The political 
branches have often relied on this flexibility to respond to international events 
or implement policies perceived to enhance safety.481 Although the political 
branches have substantial discretion to balance factors, privilege some values 
over others, and design policy, the rare case of policy accompanied by “smoking 
gun” animus differs from the usual scenario because it implicates the structural 
considerations noted above. Scholars have further disputed the concept of 
“national security exceptionalism,”482 and courts have warned against giving 
national security “talismanic” power.483 Permitting any government policy to 
be implemented simply because government officials invoke national security 
would create a reservoir of absolute power that would undermine our legal 
system’s design.484  
Finally, from the other side of the debate, critics might argue that the 
proposed framework lacks teeth, offering scrutiny insufficient to vindicate the 
important rights and interests at stake. On this view, the government would 
nearly always be able to show that it would have made the same decision 
regardless of animus simply by proffering expert views of the President’s 
national security team.485 The President might quite easily be able to satisfy the 
evidentiary requirement. Where the President can articulate a legitimate reason, 
will courts meaningfully quantify the relative contribution of that reason and the 
proffered animus? Or will they, in effect, use the “sole motive” standard 
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suggested by dissenting judges in the travel ban litigation?486 Admittedly, this 
mixed motives framework is deferential, but it nonetheless requires the 
President to prove that he has an independently sufficient legitimate reason for 
pursuing the same policy.487 This requirement of independent sufficiency means 
that courts will have to seriously scrutinize the evidence and conclude that 
legitimate reasons fully support the policy, and that the President’s animus, 
while ugly, was essentially “harmless error.”488 
The proposed approach further has expressive value.489 It condemns 
irrational hostility toward a class of people defined by a characteristic that the 
courts would regard as “protected” were these people within U.S. territory. 
Further, it signals to citizens and noncitizens here and abroad that even the 
President cannot both openly use animus as a currency with his base and 
simultaneously hide it from the courts.490 It forces the government to stop, slow 
down, and pay an “animus tax” in the form of explaining itself, demonstrating 
the legitimacy of its enactment. Even if animus-laced policies remain in place, 
the process of proving and sorting motives forces the Executive to take 
responsibility for its full set of motives.491 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurring opinion in Harisiades, 
plenary power in immigration has historically permitted laws both “crude and 
cruel,” and at the time he wrote, laws embodying racial or religious animus as 
well.492 Since that time, constitutional and immigration law have evolved, and 
the plenary power doctrine has receded in many domains.493 Under 8 U.S.C.    
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§ 1182(f), the President possesses a power that lacks clear boundaries.494 The 
search for limits, however, should encompass the full set of limits – separation 
of powers, Congress’s promulgation of an intricate statutory scheme, as well as 
improper motive.495 
Where animus influences a law that would ordinarily be entitled to 
deference, courts have generally responded in one of two ways. First, judges 
have argued for continuing to defer to the President and for ignoring his extrinsic 
statements, or considering them but nonetheless allowing the government to 
respond with a legitimate reason for the law, however pretextual or 
insubstantial.496 Second, courts have deemed the animus to be a form of bad 
faith, allowing them to apply heightened scrutiny, and requiring the government 
to supply a compelling justification for acting as it did and demonstrate that it 
has used the least restrictive means for achieving it.497 This Article, however, 
argues that there is a third way: a mixed motives framework using a “but-for” 
motive standard. This framework strives to preserve deference to the political 
branches’ judgments without mistaking animus for expertise.  
Critics observe that President Trump’s travel bans sowed chaos at home and 
abroad. Given that his Executive Orders did what he, for months, had said he 
would do, this result may surprise some. On the other hand, perhaps Americans 
and noncitizens planning to visit for work or family reasons could not believe 
that the President, a person who took the oath of office, and not merely a 
candidate engaged in electioneering, would bar noncitizens without the 
traditional reasons for invoking 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). The President’s exceptional 
use of the political branches’ plenary power to exclude noncitizens further 
inverted norms498 with his public remarks denigrating Muslims, and the courts 
have since faced a difficult challenge in drawing a line between deference and 
abdication. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Trump v. Hawaii calls for reform. 
With sensitive, important interests at stake, a more nuanced approach to 
deference and animus is needed as the lower courts consider challenges to the 
travel ban on remand, and for the future. This Article aspires to offer precisely 
such an approach.  
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